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Abstract
The practice of non-proliferation has evolved significantly since its origins during
the Cold War. The most recent and notable contribution to the non-proliferation regime
has come in the form of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), a loose consortium of
102 nation-states through which countries can coordinate, share intelligence, and build
capacity to interdict weapons of mass destruction (WMD) related transfers. My objective
in this paper is to move beyond the “activity not an organisation” rhetoric espoused by
proponents of the PSI and to ask a set of deeper and broader questions regarding why
transgovernmental networks (TGNs) like the PSI arise and take the form that they do. I
argue that for certain issue areas TGNs provide a more suitable organisational design and
mechanism for cooperation than IGOs. They offer managerial and participating states a
range of functional and strategic benefits that a formal centralised structure is unable to
provide. To achieve this objective, I identify 14 threshold criteria for an entity to qualify
as a TGN from which I derive six drivers of TGN-formation and cooperation. I also
explore the relationship between power and transgovernmental networking, focusing
specifically on the role of the U.S. in establishing, managing, and monitoring these
institutions. I suggest that TGN-based cooperation is more likely to occur and succeed
when there is concentrated power, that is, the presence of a resource rich actor, like the
U.S. willing to exercise managerial power in a productive way.
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Chapter One
An Introduction to Regime Evolution and Transgovernmental Networks

The practice of non-proliferation has evolved significantly since its origins during
the Cold War. The most recent and notable contribution to the non-proliferation regime
has come in the form of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), a loose consortium of
102 nation-states,1 through which countries can “coordinate, share intelligence, and build
capacity to interdict WMD related transfers.”2 The initiative is frequently hailed by U.S.
public officials as “an activity not an organization,”3 and it follows in the footsteps of
other multilateral export control efforts such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the
NPT Nuclear Exports Committee (the Zangger Committee), the Missile Technology
Regime (MTC), and the Australia group (AG). Like the PSI, these regime components
lack a formal treaty basis and agreements are implemented through national laws and
regulations. While nonbinding agreements and informal agreements are not new or
exceptional, these arrangements constitute what Keohane, Nye, and Slaughter have
referred to as transgovernmental networks (TGNs) – an increasingly ubiquitous

1

U.S. Department of State, Thailand Endorses the Proliferation Security Initiative, November 2012,
Available at: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/11/200849.htm Accessed on March 1, 2013
2

U.S. Department of Defense, The Nuclear Posture Review Report, April 2010, p. 32

3

Joseph G. Robert, Broadening and Deepening Our Proliferation Security Initiative Cooperation, Remarks
in Warsaw, Poland, June 23, 2006, Available at: http://2001-2009.state.gov/t/us/rm/68269.htm Accessed on
March 1, 2013
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component of modern global governance and regulation.4 These networks are defined by
loose cooperation amongst sub-state officials; they often lack executive oversight and
bureaucratic structures, and are depicted as more flexible and cost-effective than treatybased arrangements. They occupy a middle group between formal cooperation through
intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) and informal verbal agreements. As Charles
Lipson notes, they are “willows, not oaks.”5 Although both the PSI and the multilateral
export control efforts fall under the scope of TGNs, the multilateral export control
initiatives play a supporting and subsidiary role to the existing treaty/IGO structure, while
the PSI represents a significant evolutionary step for TGNs. It exists independent of the
formal structure and constitutes the political core of collective action,
My objective in this paper is to move beyond the “activity not an organisation”
rhetoric espoused by proponents of the PSI and to ask a set of deeper and broader
questions regarding why TGNs like the PSI arise and take the form that they do. In this
assessment, I define my dependent variable as the formation of TGNs, while my
independent variables are the drivers and determinants of TGN-based cooperation. I
argue that for certain issue areas TGNs provide a more suitable organisational design and
mechanism for cooperation than IGOs. TGNs are not simply a reaction to globalisation
and technical complexity,6 they also provide a range of functional and strategic benefits
4

The concept of transgovernmental relations was pioneered by Keohane and Nye in the 1970s. Anne Marie
Slaughter is the foremost proponent of transgovernmentalism in the 21st century.
5

Lipson, Charles, 'Why are Some International Agreements Informal?' International Organization, 1991,
Vol. 45(4), pp. 495-538, p. 500
6

Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, Mette, ‘Transgovernmental Networks and Non-proliferation,’ Paper Presented at
the New Power Politics Workshop, Josef Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver,
March 2013, p. 2
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to dominant and participating states that formal centralised structures like IGOs are
unable to provide. Functionality in this paper refers to the capacity to manage tasks, the
ability to bring participants to the negotiating forum, to achieve levels of coordination,
and to respond to changing threats. This paper is not intended to be an assessment of how
effective TGNs are in achieving their ultimate objective. While research on the
effectiveness of TGNs is much needed and is likely to form the subject of further
investigation, this paper focuses specifically on why TGNs arise. I look to contribute to
our understanding of the kinds of organisational benefits that a TGN can offer to
managerial and participant states. Furthermore, given that American officials in close
cooperation with their allies have founded the vast majority of existing TGNs7 and that
the literature on TGNs has largely ignored underlying power distributions, I explore the
relationship between power and transgovernmental networking. I focus specifically on
the role of the U.S. in establishing, managing, and monitoring these institutions. I argue
that TGN-based cooperation is more likely to occur and succeed when there is
concentrated power, that is, the presence of a resource rich actor, like the U.S. willing to
exercise managerial power in a productive way.
To demonstrate the dynamics and evolution of transgovernmental networking, I
apply the TGN analytical framework to a recent, successful, and in some way novel
example of transgovernmental security cooperation, the PSI. I ask three questions: 1)
What does the need for an institutional framework like the PSI suggest about the evolving
nature of the challenges facing the non-proliferation regime? 2) How does the type of role

7

Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2013
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and the nature of power exercised by the U.S. relate to the players, the organisational
structure, and the content of the PSI? 3) If the PSI-TGN interdiction model is deemed to
be an effective framework for global cooperation, then can it be transferred to other
regimes and security problems awaiting an enforcement mechanism, such as small arms?
The PSI has been the subject of considerable scholarly and policy attention for a
number of reasons. First, it reflects a growth in the role of TGNs within the nonproliferation regime. Second, the timeframe in which the PSI evolved and became
functional was marked by unusual speed and effectiveness. Third, the rules for
interdiction and the obligations on, and expectations of member states were not set out at
the time of its establishment. Fourth, it has been credited with numerous successes,
including more than two-dozen interdictions of WMD-related technology and shipments
to Iran as well as the exposure of the A.Q Khan nuclear smuggling network in 2003. In
this paper I take stock of and add to past work on the PSI by exploring changing patterns
of cooperation within the non-proliferation regime. I argue that the issue-area of nonproliferation supports the transgovernmentalist perspective – the belief that although
globalisation presents significant challenges to states, they are not disappearing or being
replaced as the primary source of governance. Instead, states are increasingly
disaggregating into their functional components, and these distinct parts “are networking
with their counterparts abroad, creating a dense web of relations that constitutes a new
transgovernmental order.”8 While TGNs can provide an alternative to cooperation based
on multilateral treaties coupled with support from formal IGOs, TGNs and IGOs do not

8

Slaughter, Anne-Marie, ‘The Real New World Order,’ Foreign Affairs, 1997, Vol. 76, pp. 183-197, p. 184
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have to be competitive architectures of cooperation. TGNs and IGOs can work
synergistically within a particular issue area. States will select different levels of
formality and structure depending upon the given situation and the factors influencing
their interests. The next step for the PSI-TGN is to engage proactively with private
industry actors to establish a “network of networks”, that is, a web of denial that greatly
diminishes if not eliminates the threat of WMD proliferation.9
This paper is organised into four major sections. Chapter Two begins with a
discussion of international regimes, including the distinction between formal IGOs and
TGNs. The current debate on TGNs has focused on whether TGNs and IGOs have
become functional substitutes or if they are simply precursors for more obligatory
agreements.10 In this chapter, I argue that for some issue areas TGNs can provide a more
favourable organisational design and mechanism for cooperation than IGOs. I identify 14
threshold criteria for an entity to qualify as a TGN and then outline the functional and
strategic benefits that TGN-based cooperation provides. From this, I derive 6 hypotheses
regarding when we might expect TGN-formation. I argue that the decision to use one
organisational form rather than another is a deliberate choice on the part of an actor
exercising leadership and managerial power, namely the U.S. Depending upon the
interests of and forces influencing upon U.S. policy, American officials will employ

9

Roberts, Guy, Interview, 26 March 2013

10

Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2013
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different strategies to engage with different actors. U.S. behaviour within a TGN
resembles that of a “quasi-imperial manager.”11
In chapter Three, I apply the TGN framework to the PSI. I argue that while TGNs
are not new to the non-proliferation regime, the PSI constitutes an evolution of the TGN
framework. The PSI is not only a noteworthy response to growing concerns over a series
of new challenges but it also represents a strategic choice on the part of U.S. policy
makers to place a TGN at the political core of cooperation. Arms control policies have
traditionally fallen into the domain of high-politics and have relied upon treaty-based
agreements. IGOs such as the United Nations (UN), the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have thus far been
the primary engines for creating and enforcing the non-proliferation norms. While TGNs
like the NSG and AU exist within the state-centric regime, they act as subsidiaries to the
treaty/IGO structure. They plug gaps on technical issues as opposed to functioning as an
alternative institutional design for cooperation. The PSI-TGN framework, on the other
hand, allows U.S. policymakers to address some of the legal and definitional challenges
posed by the treaty based regime, particularly concerning interdiction on the high seas,
without actually changing the existing regime. In this instance, cooperation through a
TGN enabled collective action on a pressing issue of security concern without resolving
or addressing the challenges posed by collective law. Given the nature of the threats
facing the non-proliferation regime today, treaties which necessitate approval by

11

Avant, Deborah, US Relations and Global Security “Governance”: Hegemonic versus Quasi-imperial
Strategies, Paper prepared for the 2012 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, New
Orleans, 30 August – 2 September, pp. 1-23
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domestic legislatures and multiple rounds of international negotiations are far too
cumbersome and time consuming to implement or amend. Moreover, this Chapter will
demonstrate that the behaviour of the U.S. in the creation, implementation, and
enforcement of the PSI resembled that of a quasi-imperial manager. Rather than acting as
a hegemon, U.S. policy makers chose to interact with an array of state and substate actors
to shape policy through “soft law” arrangements. The U.S. was initially determined to
keep the PSI proposal confidential and away from public or international scrutiny. It
sought autonomy in determining the draft principles for interdiction. Once the President
had approved the draft document, U.S. policy makers were keen to act quickly and with
authority in their efforts to implement the PSI. The players, the organisational structure,
and the guiding principles of this TGN all reflect the power dynamics underlying the PSI.
In Chapter Four, I consider whether the PSI-TGN model could be extended to
include non-state actors and promoted to fit select transnational issues that require
immediate attention but where implementing rapid treaties may be politically difficult.
For instance, the PSI Statement of Principles (SIP) could be combined with programmes
to disrupt the small-arms trade by land, sea, and air if the U.S. was interested in pursuing
it. Both require similar intelligence, legal, and military tools. Overall, this paper aims to
illustrate the dynamics and evolution of transgovernmental networking within and
beyond the non-proliferation issue area.

7

Chapter Two
Theories of International Cooperation and Transgovernmental Relations

Since the end of the Cold War, the term “regime” has increasingly come to be
associated and appended to the term “non-proliferation.”12 Although some scholars
disagree about the impetus for regime creation and compliance, there is an understanding
amongst most academics and policy makers that a non-proliferation regime exists. This
regime is concerned with the spread of nuclear weapons and related materials to states
and non-state actors. Keohane, for instance, notes that the explicit purpose of the nuclear
non-proliferation regime in the 1970s was to keep nuclear materials and knowledge from
diffusing rapidly to potential nuclear powers.13 Rublee discusses the norm of nuclear
restraint and points to some of the non-proliferation regime’s list of “high-prolife and
brazen” failures as well as successes.14
The purpose of this chapter is to lay the theoretical foundations for an analysis of
the PSI within the context of the non-proliferation regime. The overarching objective is to

12

Smith, Roger K, 'Explaining the Non-Proliferation Regime: Anomalies for Contemporary International
Relations Theory,' in International Organization, 1987, Vol. 41 (2), pp. 253-254
13

Keohane, Robert. O, 'The Demand for International Regimes,' in International Organization, Vol. 36 (2)
International Regimes, 1982, pp. 325-355, p. 352
14

Rublee, Maria Rost, Nonproliferation Norms: Why States Choose Nuclear Restrains (Athens, London:
University of Georgia Press, 2009)

identify why, in recent years, U.S. policy makers have favoured TGN-based cooperation
as opposed to other more formal architectures of cooperation. I begin by briefly
surveying contending definitions and characteristics of international regimes and the
theoretical approaches to regime development. I explore contributions made by various
theories to the study of international regimes including, realism, neoliberal
institutionalism, and constructivism. I supplement my primarily institutionalist approach
with valuable insights from constructivism, which I see as complementary rather than
competitive. As constructivists assert, institutions like TGNs are not simply the “artefacts
of strategically and rationally motivated state actors” but they are “also the location in
which reflexive new practices and policies develop.”15 States may choose to operate
through TGNs on the basis of the functional and strategic benefits they offer to
managerial and participant states, such as reduced transaction costs and speed of
implementation but these organisations also serve as forums for establishing new
practices and policies. Crucially, alone none of these theoretical approaches adequately
explain why states act through formal or informal organisations. They offer key insights
into the non-proliferation regime and TGN formation but fail to explain the wider trend
towards TGNs. As such, I draw on varying strands of argumentation, combing
constructivist thoughts on the role of ideas, norms, and expectations with a focus on the
way that powerful states structure such organisations to further their own interests in a
way that induces other states to participate. I then focus specifically on the distinguishing
features of IGOs and TGNs, concluding that TGNs are not only a way of circumventing
15

Haas, Peter. M and Ernst B. Haas, 'Pragmatic Constructivism and the Study of International Institutions,'
in Journal of International Studies, 2003, Vol. 31, pp. 573-601, p. 575

9

some of the bureaucratic problems posed by IGO based cooperation but they also provide
a more effective means of bringing together like-minded states who share similar social
identities to overcome collective action problems.

2.1 What are international regimes and do they matter?
The convergence of international behaviour through regimes has emerged as a
significant focus for empirical and theoretical research. Liberal internationalists and
institutionalists have argued that regimes are all-pervasive features of the international
system and that we can deduce the existence of a regime from patterned behaviour.
Donald Puchala and Raymond Hopkins suggest that “a regime exists in every substantive
issue-area in international relations…Wherever there is regularity in behaviour, some
kinds of principles, norms or rules must exist to account for it.”16 However, linking
regularity in patterns of behaviour to the existence of regimes runs the risk of
overestimating consensus and implicit coordination in the international community.
Susan Strange, on the other hand, questions the validity and usefulness of the concept of
regimes all together. For her “using this word regime distorts reality by implying an
exaggerated measure of predictability and order in the system.”17 This position is
consistent with a realist or structuralist orientation which envisages an international
system full of rational self-seeking states that are acting in their own interest. A third way

16

Puchala, Donald and Raymond Hopkins, ‘International Regimes: Lessons from Inductive Analysis,’ in
International Regimes ed. by Stephen Krasner (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), pp. 61-91
17

Strange, Susan, ‘Cave! Hic dragones! A critique of regime analysis,’ in International Regimes ed. by
Stephen Krasner (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), pp. 337-354, p. 345
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of viewing regimes is described by Krasner as modified structuralism. “In a world of
sovereign states the basic function of regimes is to coordinate state behavior to achieve
desired outcomes in particular issue areas.”18 This is a middle path between the structural
realists who see no value in the concept of regimes and the institutionalists who see
regimes as being an ever-prominent feature of international relations. Arthur Stein notes
that regimes can have an impact when Pareto-optimal outcomes19 could not be achieved
by states going it alone or through uncoordinated action. Regimes are created to manage
the suboptimality that can emerge from individual state behaviour.20 This approach is
helpful in explaining and understanding the non-proliferation regime, as the very nature
of the objective of preventing and actively curtailing the spread of nuclear weapons and
related materials is dependent upon coordination and cooperation between multiple
states, sub-state units, and non-state actors.
Another possible and more helpful way to understand the role of regimes and
their institutional components in international relations is through a constructivist lens.
Constructivists have sought to reassert the importance of social context into international
relations. As Alexander Wendt argues, “through repeated acts of reciprocal cooperation,
actors form mutual expectations that enable them to continue cooperation.”21 The demand
for regimes depends upon actors’ perceptions of international problems, which can be a
18

Krasner, Stephan, ‘Structural causes and regime consequences: regimes as intervening variables,’ in
International Regimes ed. by Stephen Krasner (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), pp. 1-22, p. 7
19

An outcome is Pareto-optimal if there is no other outcome in the game that can make every player just as
well off without hurting at least one player
20

Stein, Arthur. A, ‘Coordination and collaboration: regimes in an anarchic world,’ in International
Regimes ed. by Stephen Krasner (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), pp. 115-140, p. 1232
21

Wendt, Alexander, ‘Collective Identity Formation and the International State,’ in The American Political
Science Review, June 1994, Vol. 88 (2), p. 390
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product of their norms and beliefs.22 International regimes, according to constructivists,
do more than simply affect the cost benefit calculations of rational actors – they can
circumscribe action while also acting as points as reference for acceptable forms of social
behaviour. Pragmatic constructivists like Peter Haas and Ernst Haas highlight the role
that institutions can play in generating political change. They regard institutions, “partly
as arenas for designing change and partly as arrangements that bring about change as they
alter the perceptions of their members.”23 TGNs, for instance, can be the product of
managerial states exercises their desire to orchestrate change in a particular issue area,
while simultaneously altering or solidifying the perceptions of their participant states on
the issue in question, such as interdiction on the high seas. International regimes can thus
be conceptualised as principles and understandings of desirable and acceptable forms of
behaviour,24 which both influence actors and are influenced by actors.
Furthermore, constructivists argue that social identities and interests are always in
process during social interaction25 and actors develop understandings of other actors
through the mechanism of norms and practices. While neorealists prioritise material
capabilities in international relations, constructivists pay homage to the role of social
relationships. According to Wendt, social structures have three elements: “shared
knowledge, material resources, and practices.”26 Material resources of individual states,
while important, only acquire meaning for human action through the shared knowledge
22

23
25

Alexander Wendt. 1994. p 389
Haas & Haas, p. 575
Wendt, 1994, p. 386

26

Wendt, Alexander, ‘Constructing International Politics,’ in International Security, 1995 Vol. 22 (1), pp.
71-81, p. 73
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and practices in which they are embedded.27 Social structures like the non-proliferation
regime help to shape actors’ collective identities, which can then serve as the “basis for
feelings of solidarity, community, and loyalty, and thus form collective definitions of
interests.”28 These collective identities and interests play out through formal and informal
institutions like security communities aimed at curbing the proliferation of WMD related
materials. Exercising collective interests through regimes and security communities does
not mean that actors are irrational or no longer calculate individual (state) costs and
benefits of participation, rather they do so on a higher level of social aggregation.29 This
higher level of social aggregation discourages free-riding by increasing the willingness of
like-minded states to collectively bare the costs. Moreover, international organisations
(IO) have influence well beyond the material power of individual or collective states. IOs
can legitimise or delegitimise actions, they can create ideas, norms, and exceptions, and
they can enhance the power of individual states. States (managerial or participant)
consciously use these organisations both for their functional benefits such as reduced
transaction costs and increased organisational efficiency, and more broadly to influence
interests and understandings of other states.
How do we know when we see a regime? Constructivist John Ruggie first
introduced the concept of regimes in 1975, defining it as "a set of mutual expectations,
rules and regulations, plans, organizational energies and financial commitments which

27
28

29

Wendt, 1995, p. 73
Wendt, 1994, p. 386
Wendt, 1994, p. 386
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have been accepted by a group of states."30 In 1983, Krasner refined this definition to
include “a set of implicit or explicit norms, principles, rules, and decision-making
procedures around which actor’s expectations converge in a given area of international
relations.”31 Principles are defined as “beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude”; norms as
“standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations”; rules as “specific
prescriptions or proscriptions for action”; and decision-making procedures as “prevailing
practices for making and implementing collective action.”32 The above definition forms
the foundation of this paper and is consistent with other recent understandings of regimes.
Ernst Hass, for instance, argues that “regimes are norms, rules, and procedures agreed to
by states in order to regulate an issue-area.”33 He goes on to suggest that “regimes may be
housed in single international organizations, comprise the activities of several such
organs, or dispense with formal organization altogether.”34 As an example, the nonproliferation regime consists of a variety of components, both formal and informal in
nature, from the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to the
Proliferation Security Initiative. Similarly and perhaps most famously, Keohane and Nye
define regimes as “networks of rules, norms, and procedures that regularize behaviour

30

Ruggie, John Gerard, ‘International Responses to Technology: Concepts and Trends,’ in International
Organization, 1975, Vol. 34, p. 570
31

Krasner, p. 2

32

Krasner, p. 2

33

Haas, Ernst, ‘Technological Self-reliance for Latin America: the OAS Contribution,’ International
Organization, 1980, Vol. 34 (4), p. 552
34

Ibid.
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and control its effects.”35 Focusing on interdependence within world politics, they
suggest that regimes act as an intermediate step, between capabilities and power structure
within a system, and the political bargaining which occurs within it.
While there are multiple definitions of regimes, they all have in common the
understanding that they are not simply makeshift or temporary aspects of international
relations. They vary over time but they do not change with every shift in national power
or interest. Stephan Haggard and Beth Simmons argue that “regime change” can be
operationalised in terms of strength, organisational form, scope and allocational mode.
Strength is measured by the degree of compliance, organisational form refers to issues
such as the centralisation and decentralisation of the administration apparatus, scope
concerns the range of issues the regime covers, and allocational mode refers to the
different social mechanisms for resource distribution.36 To this Krasner adds “change
within a regime involves alterations of rules and decision-making procedure, but not of
norms or principles; change of a regime involves alteration of norms and principles.”37
The growth of TGNs within the non-proliferation issue area clearly implies change within
a regime. The rules and decision-making procedures have shifted from formal IGOs to
looser and less formal modes of cooperation. While the implications of the PSI-TGN
framework, namely the potential for the development of a new interdiction norm, might
imply a change of the regime. Thus, regimes and their components clearly can and do

35

Keohane, Robert. O and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence (Boston: Little Brown, 1997), p. 19

36

Haggard Stephan and Beth A. Simmons, ‘Theories of International Regimes,’ International
Organization, 1987, Vol. 41(3): pp. 491-517, p. 496
37

Krasner, p. 5

15

evolve, however, they do not change overnight or with every shift in political or strategic
interest. Regimes are intended to be more permanent features of international politics.
Given the importance of IGOs and the trend towards TGNs within the nonproliferation regime, the following two sections will provide a closer examination of
these two regime components and their distinguishing features. This will include an
assessment of why TGNs arise and the likelihood for TGN-based cooperation. Drawing
from these sections, Chapter Three and Chapter Four will provide an in-depth analysis of
the PSI as it fits within the dynamics of transgovernmental networking and the nonproliferation regime.

2.2 The Trend Towards Transgovernmental Cooperation
The idea of transgovernmental relations was first pioneered by Keohane and Nye
in the 1970s. In an article for World Politics journal, the authors question the assumption
that states are the only actors in the international system and that they always act as
individual units. Critiquing the ‘black-box’38 view of a state and state interactions, they
differentiate between two types of international state cooperation - intergovernmental
cooperation and transgovernmental cooperation. Intergovernmental cooperation refers to
direct interactions between top leaders, heads of state or foreign offices sustained through
formal organisations, particularly IGOs. Transgovernmental cooperation, on the other

38

A black box state is one whose internal characteristics and behaviour are of little relevance to its external
actions

16

hand, takes place below the apex of organisational hierarchy.39 It is defined as “sets of
direct interactions among sub-units of different governments that are not controlled or
closely guided by the policies of the cabinets or chief executives of those governments.”40
Within transgovernmental cooperation two separate categories can be identified. The first
type

of

“communication

does

not

necessarily

contradict

the

conventional

conceptualization of states as coherent coalitions vis-a-vis the outside world.”41 It simply
refers to the most basic type of informal communication among working level officials of
bureaucracies. Informal cooperation of this nature can even take place in the corridors of
IGOs. It can help to assist cooperation through more formal structures or it can act as a
forum for discussing how to improve the implementation of existing treaties. When these
ad hoc patterns of coordination and cooperation become regularised and institutionalised,
a more deliberate form of TGN can arise. To increase the likelihood of success and to
advance specific policy goals, governmental sub-units may choose to informally
coordinate their decision-making with actors from other governments through TGNs.42 If
successful, the products of transgovernmental policy coordination are different than they
would be if each TGN partner were limited to acting through their own bureaucracy.43
While the first category of basic and informal transgovernmental relations is of
analytical and theoretical interest, this second category forms the subject of this paper.
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These autonomous and deliberate TGNs are, in and of themselves, sources of governance
and informal rule making. Within the non-proliferation issue area, the Cooperative Threat
Reduction (CTR) initiative, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the
Container Security Initiative (CSI), the Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI),
and the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass
Destruction (“10 Plus 10 Over 10 Program”), The Transhipment Countries Export
Control Initiative (TECI), the Secure Freight Initiative (SFI), the Global Threat
Reduction Initiative (GTRI), the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism
(GICNT), and the PSI are all examples of TGNs. Given the PSI’s ability to generate
support from 102 different countries and its role in spurring into existence a range of
other TGNs, it will serves as a the primary case study for this paper.
To date, the literature on TGNs has paid inadequate attention to the relationship
between concentrated power and network formation. Some scholars have highlighted the
need for a powerful state to act as a bureaucratic point of contact within TGNs,44 while
others have pointed to the effects of regulatory power on policy outcomes. However,
there has been little discussion of how material and issue-specific power can initiate,
drive and sustain TGN activity. The U.S. has played a crucial role in forming and steering
TGN-based cooperation, yet American officials are awarded the same analytical status as
sub-state representatives from other countries. As will be discussed in greater detail later
in this Chapter, concentrated power is a precondition for TGN formation. Moreover, as
Avant notes, “US policy makers are often strategic in determining which relationship(s)
44
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to work through in pursuit of their goals. Performing one role rather than another,
however, has consequences.” When the U.S. acts as a hegemon it interacts with states and
state based IGOs and is constrained by domestic interests.45 For instance, the influence of
the Jewish lobby on domestic U.S. politics and U.S. ties to Israel, led the Obama
administration to stymie a UN General Assembly vote on Palestinian statehood in 2011 –
even through the vote would only elevate the status of the Palestinian Authority from
nonvoting “observer entity” to “observer state.” Once it became clear that a vote was to
go ahead, U.S. officials began to exercise hegemonic power by threatening Palestinian
officials with significant financial retaliations. The U.S. also lobbied allies such as the
Canada and the United Kingdom to vote against a change in Palestinian status or to
simply abstain from the vote. In this case, it was in the interest of the U.S. to use its
power to forestall action rather than encourage change.
Avant suggests that the U.S. can also use its powers in a more fruitful way to
generate new action.46 Instead of exhibiting hegemonic traits, the U.S. can act as a quasiimperial manager (as it does within TGNs), interacting with a range of state and non-state
actors to serve both its own interest and the interest of the wider community. While the
U.S. lacks the kind of control that was typical in more classical empires, it can
nonetheless influence intermediaries and orchestrate support for a particular action by
means of its structural and material advantage. Take the private military and security
services industry as an example. In the wake of incidents in Iraq and criticism from
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Congress and civil society groups, the U.S. began to participate in and lead a range of
multi-stakeholder informal regulatory initiatives, such as the Montreux Process. Given
that a number of private military and security companies (PMSC) are headquartered in
the United States, U.S. officials saw this Swiss initiative as an opportunity to both
respond to critiques regarding the PMSC industry, while simultaneously controlling the
market for force.47 In turn, U.S. policy and regulation were informed by the language and
content of the Montreux document, which highlighted the deficiencies in the U.S. system
that led to problems in Iraq and Afghanistan.48 The U.S. plays a similar role in the
orchestration and management of TGN-based cooperation. When the U.S. wants to
generate new action, there are limits to what hegemonic power and going it alone can
accomplish. While the U.S. could work through IGOs, these formal arrangements are
tedious and more susceptible to international intransigence. As the U.S. possesses
sufficient levels of material and issue specific power to bring together sub state units are
well connected, that already share their preferences, and have demonstrated capacity to
affect the issue in the past, it is more rational for them to establish and manage their own
mechanism for cooperation and collective action. Furthermore, the lack of a monitoring
and enforcement mechanism implies that TGNs may be dependent upon the actor who
established the network to ensure compliance and enforce cooperation. Thus, TGN-based
cooperation is more likely to occur when there is concentrated power, such as that
possessed by the U.S. in certain issue areas.
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2.3 Intergovernmental Organisations
In order to understand why there has been a growing trend towards TGNs, it is
important to first consider the characteristics of IGOs and the advantages and
disadvantages of IGO based cooperation. There exists a large amount of analytical and
empirical scholarship on IGOs, including patterns in IGO growth and membership and
the effect of IGOs on state behaviour. States use IGOs in a number of different ways,
from setting agendas to settling conflicts. They are a ubiquitous feature of international
regimes, which typically form the regime core. This includes, the non-proliferation
regime, which has employed IGOs as mechanisms for cooperation.
There have been numerous attempts to identify empirical criteria for IGOs. In
1970, Wallace and Singer identified four such criteria: the organisation must consist of at
least two qualified members of the international system; it must hold regular plenary
sessions at intervals not greater than a decade; it must have a permanent headquarters;
and it must be independent from other IGOs.49 Because a significant proportion of the
literature on IGOs has converged to a three-state definition, Pevehouse, Nordstom, and
Warnke updated their IGO nomenclature to include a three-state minimum in 2004.50
While an organisation containing two member states could be of academic and theoretical
interest, it falls within the domain of bilateral rather than multilateral relations.51 They
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define an IGO as: a formal entity (formed by an internationally recognised treaty); with
three or more sovereign states; and a permanent secretariat with institutional features
such as a headquarters and/or a permanent staff.52 Taking together these three empirical
criteria, Volgy, Fausett, Grant and Rodgers offer a conceptual definition of formal IGOs
(FIGOs) as “entities created with sufficient organizational structure and autonomy to
provide formal, ongoing, multilateral processes of decision-making between states, along
with the capacity to execute the collective will of their members (states).”53 They note
that this conceptual definition highlights both the process of interactions within FIGOs as
well as the possibility of collective outcomes from these processes.54 They also identify
11 threshold values as operational criteria for designating an entity as a FIGO. These
criteria are outlined in Table 1 below.
These threshold values listed are helpful in two ways. First, they help us to
identify the distinguishing features of formal IGOs, which in turn will inform our
understanding of why states may choose to work through such organisations. Concerns
relating to membership criterion, rules of governance, budget, and funding independence
all factor into a state’s decision to pursue cooperation through one form of organisation
above another. Second, the threshold values will be critical in differentiating between
IGOs and TGNs, and understanding the reasons behind why TGNs like the PSI arise.
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Table 1 Threshold Requirements for FIGOs adapted from Thomas Volgy et al. Table I.
Comparison of Threshold Requirements for FIGO Classification versus Other
Collections Enumerating IGOs.55
Criterion

FIGO Data

Membership
Number of States

Three or more

Mix

Predominantly by states; no veto on collective
decision by non-state members

Representation

Representing central governments or its sub-units

Rules of Governance

Specified in charter

Meetings

Routinised and meeting at regular intervals and at
least every four years

HQ/Secretariat:

Permanent and non-symbolic

Staffing Presence

More than two (paid by IGO)

Staffing Independence

Independence of any IGO or any single state

Budget
Amount

Sufficient to cover minimal staffing and operation

Funding mechanism

Routinely identified; regularly available

Source

Majority funding not controlled by another IGO or
one state

Pevehouse et al.’s focus on membership, rules of governance, and budget as
threshold requirements for formal IGO classification is reflected in Abbott and Snidal’s
research on why states act through formal international organisation. They propose that
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formal international organisations offer centralisation and autonomy – two characteristics
which not only distinguish formal organisations from other international institutions, but
also produce a range of political effects which make working through an IGO attractive.
Centralisation refers to:
“a concrete and stable organisational structure and an administrative
apparatus managing collective activities” while independence refers to “the
authority to act with a degree of autonomy, and often with neutrality, in defined
spheres.”56

Abbott and Snidal argue that established and formal organisation provide a stable
negotiating forum that enhances iteration and reputational effects. Even at the height of
the Cold War, the IAEA, for example, served as a superpower forum for discussing
technical nuclear issues without the intrusion of high politics.57 By increasing
transparency amongst stakeholders in the negotiating process, IGOs can also serve to
minimise misperception and avoid miscalculated responses. The diversity of members
and the scope of application can facilitate long-term cooperation by encouraging issue
linkages in a variety of different areas. IGOs can also help states take the long view on a
particular issue or set of relations as opposed to responding to immediate concerns and
payoffs.
Representation and voting rules, which are inherent features of certain types of
IGOs, “constitutionalise” balances among states that have different levels of power,
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interest, and knowledge.58 States that possess advanced nuclear technologies and large
quantities of nuclear material are guaranteed seats on the IAEA Board of Governors.59
IGOs do more than simply support interstate relations; they also act as mechanisms for
pooling activities, assets, or risks. A stable organisational structure with a specialised
staff can significantly reduce transaction costs.60 Member states of the World Bank pool
their financial resources, which enables the organisation to make credible financial
commitments to borrowers who rely upon them for costly planning and investment
decisions.61
The operation of an IGO as an independent, “neutral actor can transform relations
among states, enhancing the efficiency and legitimacy of collective and individual
actions.”62 Consider briefly the example of Libya in 2001. On 26 February 2011 the
Security Council voted unanimously to impose sanctions against the Libyan authorities.
Resolution 1970 placed an obligation on all United Nations Member States to:
“freeze without delay all funds, other financial assets and economic
resources which are on their territories, which are owned or controlled, directly or
indirectly, by the individuals or entities” listed in the resolution.63
The document also placed an arms embargo on Libya, calling on all Member States to:
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“immediately take the necessary measures to prevent the direct or indirect
supply, sale or transfer to the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, from or through their
territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of arms and
related material of all types, including weapons and ammunition.”64
Furthermore, the resolution marked the first time that a country had been
unanimously referred to the International Criminal Court by the Security Council. While
Resolution 1970 was proposed by a small group of states with shared preferences,
namely, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States, approval of the
resolution by all 15 members of the Security Council generated obligations for the wider
UN community. Support from states that traditionally disagree with the US gave the
resolution a neutral overtone, thus enhancing the efficiency and legitimacy of the
sanctions. A lack of UN approval might have cast an unsavoury light upon U.S. action as
it did with U.S. intervention in Iraq in 2003, but with approval. As Abott and Snidal note,
neutrality adds impartiality to independence,65 facilitating the achievement of a collective
objective.
By taking advantage of the threshold requirements of formal IGOs and
characteristics such as centralisation and independence, states can achieve certain goals
that they may not have been able to accomplish as effectively through unilateral action or
direct relations with other actors. IGOs can provide economies of scale, they can act as
forums for discussion, they can enhance transparency and facilitate issue linkages, and
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they can encourage states to take the long view. The allure of these benefits persuades
states to work through formal arrangements as opposed to decentralised ones.
Abbott and Snidel argue that the move from decentralised cooperation to formal
international organisations “occurs when the costs of direct state interaction outweigh the
costs of international organisation, including consequent constraints on unilateral
action.”66 Drawing from constructivist theories of international relations, I contend that
while this assessment is correct, it only advances a partial truth. The U.S. may decide to
move from informal to formal arrangements on the basis of a strategic calculation but
they may also revert back to decentralised decision-making structures to create new
information, ideas, norms, and expectations. Moreover, costs and benefits are not always
known in advance or equal to each participating state. The shift from one organisational
form to another is not permanent or unidirectional. A decision by U.S. officials to pursue
a less formalised structure to further collective goals is also based upon a similar
assessment of the functional and strategic costs and benefits (if known) as well as the
capacity to influence interests, intersubjective understandings, and the operating
environment of other states. There are a number of disadvantages to centralised
cooperation that are considered at length in the next section. However, it is worth
dedicating some attention to them here.
First, rather than being a forum for cooperation and consensus, IGOs can become
a focus of international struggle and disagreement. Although the UN Security Council
unanimously approved sanctions against Libya in 2011, there are plenty of instances of
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power struggles hampering the Security Council’s efforts to respond to a crisis. On 19
July 2011, for instance, the Security Council failed to adopt a resolution that would have
threatened sanctions on Damascus due to negative votes by permanent member Russia
and China. Other IGOs such as the European Union (EU) are similarly prone to
controversy. At present, the EU is struggling to unify around a single economic path for
the future. One narrative centres on strengthening the EU institutional framework and
addressing its structural weaknesses, and the other emphasises the need for domestic
austerity and reform of domestic economic policy. All the while, the UK is attempting to
renegotiate its membership and calling for a repatriation of powers from the EU to the
UK.
Second, the level of support an IGO or a treaty gets is often contingent upon
whether it promotes participants’ domestic and national interests and/or goals. Realist
theory and academics like Susan Strange find that the focus on formal IGOs is naïve
because these regime components merely reflect national interest and power. While
international law creates an illusion of an ordered system, powerful states like the U.S.
will only comply with rules and regulations when it is in their self-interest to do so. The
point at which an IGO policy or treaty begins to diverge from U.S. interests will be the
point at which U.S. policy makers begin to employ harder and less cooperative forms of
power. For instance, in 2006 the Bush administration voted against the Arms Trade
Treaty (ATT) as its position in the UN was overly influenced by domestic constituencies
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like the National Rifle Association (NRA).67 Although eight years later, on 2 April 2013,
the Obama administration voted with the majority for approval of the ATT, the treaty’s
ratification prospects in the Senate still appear bleak due to opposition from the gun
lobby. Furthermore, formal IGOs often give less powerful countries equal representation
and the tools to stymie regulatory and governance efforts generated by more powerful
countries. In other words, while powerful countries can veto decisions that are against
their interests, so too can less powerful countries. Thus, a major limitation of IGO based
cooperation is that support and success is heavily dependent upon the relationship
between the issue area under question and the domestic interests of powerful countries
that may have the capacity to actually implement and enforce the arrangement.
Finally, formal centralised institutions often suffer from severe budgetary and
fiscal problems, which can hinder cooperation and the effectiveness of collective action.
The growing cost of operations and pressures stemming from austerity cuts have left a
number of countries unwilling or unable to pay their dues. The existing UN assessment
system, for instance, has left eight member states covering 76% of the overall costs
despite fiscal challenges within each of those countries. The U.S. is the largest
contributor to the UN and many have raised concerns over the level of influence and
leverage that U.S. officials have over UN policy. In 2011, the Obama administration
decided to cut funding for UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO) following its approval of Palestine’s bid for full membership. The

67

Avant, Deborah, ‘Soft Law and “Effective” Fragmented Governance: Comparing Regulation in Small
Arms and Military and Security Services,” Presented at the IISL Conference on Law, Contestation, and
Power in the Global Political Economy, Onati, Spain, June 7-8, 2012, p.13

29

requirement to pool resources often generates an expectation regarding a return on
investment, which can undermines IGO claims to autonomy and independence. Formal
IGO cooperation, thus, comes with a range of budgetary and fiscal issues.
In the next section, I draw on the characteristics and weaknesses of IGO based
cooperation to identify the threshold criteria for TGNs and to assess why TGNs like the
PSI arise and take the form that they do.

2.4 Identifying the Characteristics of and Conditions for TGN-based Cooperation
Many have pointed to the cross border activities of banks, private corporations,
criminals, terrorists and non-governmental organisations to demonstrate the prominence
of networks and to argue that this type of non-state actor cooperation has posed a
considerable threat to the dominance and authority of states. While these networks are
certainly an integral component of the international system, they are not simply confined
to the domain of non-state actors.68 Transgovernmental ties and networks have existed
for a number of years (the International Telegraphic Union (1865) and the World Health
Organisation (1948)). What is new is the rapid proliferation of these TGNs and the scope
and strength of the ties between sub-state officials.
Although TGNs provide an alternative to formal IGO/treaty based cooperation,
they do not necessarily have to constitute competitive architectures of cooperation. Under
some conditions, TGNs can support the existing structure and treaty. At other times, they
68
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may simply play the role of a gap-filler. They can exist independently, in opposition or in
congruence with the existing regime. When different components of a regulatory regime
work together and complement the efforts of one another, they are more likely to be
effective. This section will identify 14 threshold criteria to qualify an entity as a TGN as
well as the conditions under which a TGN may arise. Furthermore, I will argue that the
impetus for transgovernmental networking is not simply based on an assessment of
functional benefits. TGNs are also underpinned by power politics. Empirically, EilstrupSangiovanni notes, most TGNs are linked to powerful states, so what prompts states to
delegate a particular policy to a TGN that does not operate under direct supervision as
opposed to an IGO that is centralised and has a set operating procedures?69
Faced with growing the complexity of world politics and an increase in the
variety of actors regulating a particular issue area, many scholars have called into
question the realist state-centric analysis of the international system. Liberal
internationalists have drawn fire from several quarters with some academics arguing that
globalisation and the rise of non-state actors have undermined the traditional statist
foundations of the prevailing forms of cooperation. According to a third perspective – the
transgovernmentalist perspective - although globalisation does challenge the states’
regulatory capacity, “states remain the only actors with the authority to provide effective
and legitimate governance.”70 While the state is not disappearing, it is being forced to
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change the way that it engages with its counterparts and variety of non-state actors both
within its domestic constituency and abroad.

2.4.1

TGN Characteristics
So what are the threshold criteria for qualifying as a TGN? Eilstrup-Sangiovanni

suggests that to bring the distinguishing institutional traits of TGNs into focus, its helpful
to first consider TGNs qua networks.71 She identifies three principal features of networks.
First, networks are flat and decentralized structures with decision-making dispersed
among multiple actors. They lack a top-down management structure. Lower-level units
can have relationships with multiple higher-level units as well as lateral links with units
at the same level of organisation.72 Second, networks tend to have self-enforcing
governance structures, which rely, to a great extent upon interpersonal trust. Networks
lack enforcement and legal arbitration procedures; rather, they depend primarily upon
reputation and expectations of reciprocity to govern relations.73 Third, EilstrupSangiovanni argues that rather than administrative fiat, the decision-mode within
networks is predominantly led by deliberation, consensus, and mutual adjustment. The
lack of a central or governing authority within networks makes them less suitable for
more structured and rigid forms of decision-making.
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Table 2 Threshold Criteria for Transgovernmental Networks compared against
Intergovernmental Networks
Criterion

Intergovernmental
Networks

Membership
Number of States

Three or more

Shared preferences

N/A

Mix

Predominantly by states;
no veto on collective
decision by non-state
members
Representing central
governments or its subunits
Specified in charter
Routinised and meeting at
regular intervals and at
least every four years
Permanent and nonsymbolic
More than two (paid by
IGO)
Independence of any IGO
or any single state
Formal Voting

Representation
Rules of Governance
Meetings
HQ/Secretariat
Staffing Presence
Staffing Independence
Decision-mode
Budget
Amount
Funding mechanism
Source
Legal Basis
Scope

Sufficient to cover minimal
staffing and operation
Routinely identified;
regularly available
Majority funding not
controlled by another IGO
or one state
Treaty
Broad and Narrow
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Transgovernmental
Networks
Three or more; initially a
core group but can
expand to broader
membership
Initially like-minded
states; can later be
expanded to broader
membership base
Only sub-state units
representing states NOT
NGOs
Representing sub-state
units
Uncodified
Regularised but not
necessarily specified
None
None
None
Deliberation and
consensus
Unspecified
Unspecified
Unspecified; May or
may not be controlled by
one state
No treaty
Narrow; tend to focus on
specific issues

While there exists a substantial body of literature on TGNs and the characteristics
of networks in general, there is a lacuna on the empirical dimensions for identifying
TGNs. Based on the three network criteria outlined by Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and the
existing literature on TGNs, I present 14 threshold values that may be used to
operationalise criteria for designating an entity as a TGN. I title the criteria under the
headings of participation, rules of governance, budget, legal basis, and scope. I by no
means suggest that these criteria provide a comprehensive and definitive list of TGN
characteristics. A full assessment of the qualifying features of TGNs will require a
detailed empirical analysis which tests these criteria against the range of TGNs in
existence today, which is beyond the scope of the paper.74 For now, I draw upon the
substantial yet disjointed body of literature on TGNs to offer an assessment of the
characteristics that might constitute a TGN. These criteria are discussed below and
summarised in Table 2.
First, similar to IGOs, I concur that the threshold for participation of a TGN is
three or more states, or more specifically, constituent sub-units that represent three or
more states. Although transgovernmental relations might occur between two states, these
do not constitute a multilateral network as conceived by the majority of the literature on
TGNs. Instead, they fall within the domain of bilateral transgovernmental relations.
Furthermore, TGNs tend to arise among a small core group of states.75 The PSI, for
instance, involved pledges of support from 11 countries in 2003; the Financial Stability
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Forum (FSF) received endorsement from the Finance Ministers and Central Bank
Governors of seven states in 1999; and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) was formed
in 1975 by seven nations with similar nuclear fuel cycle capabilities. While TGNs
generally arise from a small core group, they can grow to include a much wider
participant list. The PSI now has 102 participants, the FSF (now replaced by the Financial
Stability Board (FSB)) has extended membership to 20 states, and the NSG membership
has grown to 46 nuclear supplier states.
Second, relating to participation, TGNs are traditionally formed by like-minded
states that share preferences with the dominant and central state. More often than not, the
state exercising managerial power is the U.S., thus TGN participants tend to be those who
share preferences with the U.S. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF), which is often
presented as a successful example of a TGN, facilitates coordination of anti-money
laundering regulation among 36 liberal democracies.76 The 11 states that were invited to
participate in the initial stages of PSI deliberations were all states that had previously
cooperated with the U.S. in the regulation of the non-proliferation issue. Shared
preferences ease the process of reciprocity amongst states that have in common similar
perceptions of a particular problem and preferences on how to act. Shared preferences
will also go some way to explaining network formation in the next section.
The third and fourth criteria refer to the mix and representation of membership.
IGOs can be representative of states or sub-state units, TGNs, on the other hand, only
represent sub-state units of government, populated by experts as opposed to generalist
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diplomats. The individuals who represent their states are not necessarily expected to
represent the declared preferences of the executive branch of government. Furthermore,
while NGOs may be invited to participate in discussions, the very nature of
transgovernmental relations implies the occurrence of interactions between sub-state
units as opposed to states and non-state actors. Of course, a TGN can evolve into a multistakeholder process. In fact, this evolution may even be desired and constitute the ideal
type for certain issue areas. However, the point at which non-state actors begin having a
weighted say in the deliberations of TGNs is when the transgovernmental network can no
longer be classified as such; rather, it becomes a transnational network.
The next set of criteria (five to ten) concern the bureaucratic organisation of the
TGN, that is, the rules of governance, meetings, HQ/secretariat, staffing presence,
staffing independence, and decision mode. The rules of governance refer to whether the
procedural requirements are set out in a charter or a treaty and are easy to uncover or if
they are uncodified and implicit. For IGOs, Volgy et al. argue that these procedural rules
are usually set out in a charter and are easily accessible to member states. In TGNs,
however, since there are no set procedures or rules, there is nothing to codify. Meetings
are regularised but they are not necessarily specified. There is no explicit agreement that
those participant sub-units representing states must meet once, twice, or three times a
year. While IGOs are often put forth as representative organisations where voting is
conducted through formal procedures and where majority rule may apply, TGNs operate
on the basis of deliberation and consensus.77 A functional benefit of TGNs is that, unlike
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IGOs, they are not limited by the constraints of formal voting and equal representation.
TGNs also lack a secretariat and in turn a permanent staffing presence. Of the known
TGNs, only the Wassenaar Arrangement has a central secretariat. The CSI, NSG, the
Zangger committee, the Missile Technology Regime (MTC), and the AG all lack a
centralised international HQ. Staff is usually drawn from or attached to a particular
participant state (usually the state that is exercising leadership or acting as the focal point
for the TGN). For instance, Japan for the NSG, France for the MTCR, Australia for the
AG, and the U.S. for the PSI. In turn, TGN staff is neither autonomous nor independent.
Staff members are derived from a particular country and are therefore likely and perhaps
even expected to reflect the interests of that country.
Permanent professional staffing requires a permanent source of funding. This
raises the next set of criteria concerning budgets. Given that TGN-based cooperation is
informal with each participant implementing and enforcing agreements in accordance
with domestic laws and practice,78 TGNs tend to lack a pooled budget that is routinely
and systematically available to participants or independent of any one-member state. As
the TGN lacks a codified charter, the budget amount, the funding mechanism, and the
source of funding are all unspecified. If anything, like the staffing presence, funding for
particular projects tends to be associated with or linked to dominant or powerful states,
usually the U.S., which also acts as the focal point for negotiations and plays a
managerial role.
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IGO agreements are predominately legalised through a formal treaty. TGNs tend
to lack this kind of legal treaty basis. Some TGNs like the EU dual-use regime, the
Zangger Committee, and other multilateral export control efforts are loosely attached to
formal treaties, such as the NPT, however, the objectives, the guidelines, and the rules of
governance are not codified in a treaty and they do not by themselves generate or spur
new treaties. Responding to a point of clarification from Russian Deputy Foreign
Minister Kislyak, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security
John Bolton said that the text of the PSI “was not carved in stone, but neither should he
treat it as still being in the word processor.”79 TGNs, therefore, occupy a middle ground
between international versions of gentleman’s agreements and legally binding
international documents.
The final criterion refers to scope. Whereas IGOs have the capacity to
simultaneously focus on a range of global issues, TGNs tend to be confined to a few
“narrow issue-specific problems.”80 Many scholars have concluded that the likelihood for
TGN-based cooperation is greater on highly technical issues which lack political salience,
as opposed to larger issues of national security which attract considerable political and
media attention (Keohane 1979; Slaughter 2004; Raustialla 2002). I suggest that although
some TGNs may tackle highly technical issues, these networks can also be used to
address issues of high political salience, including challenges relating to international
security. Technical complexity and political salience are not necessarily inversely
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correlated. The qualifying criterion for TGNs is narrow issue-specific scope as opposed
to high complexity or low political salience.
Drawing from the existing literature on TGNs and networks, this set of 14 criteria
constitutes my threshold for identifying a TGN. It is important to note that not all of the
criteria detailed here are exclusive to a TGN. Some TGN characteristics clearly over lap
with IGOs: the requirement of three or more members, the shared preferences, the
representation of sub-state units, and the narrow issue specific focus. However, these
features alone do not qualify TGNs. It is only when taken together with other
characteristics, such as the lack of an HQ or secretariat, an uncodified charter,
deliberation and consensus as the decision-mode as opposed to formal voting, and the
absence of a treaty or a formal budget, can an entity be classified as a TGN. From these
criteria, I now derive six hypotheses about why TGNs like the PSI arise and take the form
that they do. Many of the widely quoted and generic benefits of TGN-based cooperation,
such as flexibility, speed, and low transaction costs stem from the characteristics outlined
above. However, there are additional conditions of TGN-based cooperation, including the
relationship between power and networked governance and the nature of the issue under
question, which help to explain why some problems appear to be better suited to TGN
cooperation than others. Some of the conditions outlined below are necessary but alone
they are insufficient to spur TGN cooperation.
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2.4.2

Conditions for TGN Formation and Cooperation.
The dependent variable in this analysis is the formation of TGNs. The purpose of

this section is to consider the independent variables, that is, the driving factors that
influence the likelihood of TGN-based cooperation.

H1: TGN-based-cooperation is more likely to occur when there is concentrated
power within an issue area, that is, the presence of a resource rich actor willing to
exercise managerial power in a productive way.
As was discussed earlier in this chapter, concentrated power is an important
precondition for transgovernmental cooperation. TGNs do not come about organically they are often created and managed by powerful actors with a vested interest in
exercising issue specific power. The U.S. has traditionally acted as a quasi-imperial
power, steering TGNs and managing a range of sub-unit stakeholder relationships via soft
law arrangements. Without a formal monitoring and enforcement mechanism, TGNs have
relied upon a dominant actor like the U.S. to coordinate discussion and action. While this
actor is not formally recognised as the focal point of communications, negotiations, and
deliberations, it is implicitly awarded a managerial status by participant actors, who give
up a degree of their own organisational agency for two reasons. First, they may have been
forcibly volunteered to do so in return for a range of participatory incentives, and second,
the dominant actor may be the only power with the resources to efficiently and
effectively organise cooperation. Without concentrated power, TGN-based cooperation is
unlikely to arise or succeed. Successful TGN cooperation requires a degree of confidence
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regarding compliance by participants, which in turn necessitates the presence of an agent
with the capabilities to monitor and enforce arrangements.

H2: TGN-based-cooperation favours issues where there are opportunities for
heterogeneous contracting by the managerial power.
Heterogeneous contracting implies that “the terms of incorporation between the
center and each periphery involve different rights and responsibilities.”81 Uniformed
contracting, on the other hand, implies that “the same set of generalised agreements hold
between all incorporate political communities.”82 Powerful states, like the U.S., are more
likely to favour TGN-based cooperation if they can offer individual participants different
terms of engagement. States may have different motivations for joining and adhering to
TGN guidelines, and powerful states can use this diversity in their favour. While the
‘core group’ of states may receive favourable treatment, incentives, or policies, the wider
network does not necessarily have to receive the same level or type of benefit. Stemming
from varying terms of engagement, TGN participants may also have differing levels of
obligations. Referring specifically to the non-proliferation area, Guy B. Roberts, NATO
Deputy Assistant Secretary General For Weapons of Mass Destruction Policy, suggests
that initiatives usually involve three types of obligations:
“Some are active obligations. These initiatives are used to coordinate the
activities and participation in a given action. There are passive obligations in which
participants merely accede to an agreement, perhaps publicly proclaiming their
81
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support, but they are not generally required to perform any specific function. There
are also support obligations, in which members agree to provide support such as
funding, information, training, or equipment.”83
I suggest that even within a particular initiative or TGN, the type of obligations
that participants are required to fulfil may vary and evolve. Core states may have
“support obligations” which involve providing funding, information, training, or
equipment, while others may simply have passive obligations, which stem from the fact
that they have proclaimed their support to the initiative. If a powerful state requires
action, then it may call upon a state that has passively lent its support to become an active
state with active obligations. While IGOs are clearly not devoid of obligations, the shift
between one type of obligation and another can be considerably harder. TGNs are
predominantly based on trust and awareness of common enterprise – as the nature and
demands of this enterprise changes, so might the obligations and terms of engagement. A
managerial power is more likely to support TGN-based cooperation if they can shape or
dictate the terms of engagement in a specific issue area.

H3: TGN formation is most likely when there are short time horizons.
TGNs can enhance the speed of decision-making and reduce the transaction costs
of international cooperation for states that share preferences with the dominant state.
Treaties often take years and sometimes even decades to negotiate and enact.
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Deliberations around the Nonproliferation Treaty, for instance, began in 1965; however,
the document did not open for signature until three years later in 1968 and enter into
force until 1970. The Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty was first proposed in 1967 but
only received ratification from the senate in 1972. The UN Convention on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities became the subject of UN debate in 1987; it opened for
signature twenty years later in 2007, and it was rejected by U.S. Senate five years after
that. Treaty based regimes are consistently slower and more expensive to implement than
TGNs, which do not require domestic ratification or a long deliberation process. This is
not to say that IGO based cooperation has no value. Instead, formal cooperation may
make more sense if the U.S. anticipates that cooperation over an issue or set of issues will
endure over time.84 Furthermore, the lack of binding rules in a TGN may leave scope for
frequent renegotiation of the agreement, which in turn can increase the bargaining costs
associated with participation.85 However, TGN-based cooperation may be more attractive
to a managerial state like the U.S. if time horizons are short,86 that is, if the issue under
question requires a quick response or if there is an assumption that the arrangement will
simply be one-off.
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H4: Issue volatility and uncertainty favour TGN-based cooperation.
A number of political scientists and sociologists have argued that ability of
networks to adapt quickly to unanticipated environmental changes lends them more to
addressing issues that are more volatile and unpredictable in nature. IGOs are tied to
formal rules and structures. Treaties are set in stone and are often extremely cumbersome
to amend. TGNs, on the other hand, are more sensitive to exogenous shocks. The lack of
legally binding rules means that they can be changed quickly to suit the required
circumstances. The Plaza Communiqué and the Louvre Accord, for example, were
informal arrangements designed to respond to volatile currency movements. According
to Anthony Aust, a legal counsellor to Britain’s Foreign Office in 1986, "One of the
greatest advantages of an informal instrument is the ease with which it can be
amended."87 Through TGNs, states can avoid having to commit funds and resources to a
particular bureaucratic structure, if they believe that the issue may be volatile, susceptible
to exogenous shocks, and require amending in the near future.

H5: TGN-based cooperation is more likely if the issue is susceptible to
intransigence at the international level.
One can also expect TGN-based cooperation to occur if the issue area under
consideration is unlikely to receive quick and extensive cooperation from states working
through an IGO mechanism. This benefit speaks to two characteristics of TGNs. First,
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TGNs lack an equity based decision-making structure and second, they tend to arise from
a small homogenous core of states with shared preferences. Like-minded groups and
actors that have cooperated on issues in the past may be more likely to share similar
perceptions of a problem and visions of how to address this problem. If the issue has a
high level of political salience, states may favour cooperating with smaller groups of substate actors, that are less likely to throw a spanner in the bureaucratic works.
Furthermore, the lack of an equity based decision-making structure not only allows states
to avoid the ‘international veto’ problem but it also enables them to bypass potential
international spoilers without having to develop a comprehensive spoiler management
strategy. Spoilers are those actors who have a vested interest in derailing the
deliberations; in essence, they believe that either the discussion process or the result of
the discussions will threaten their power, worldview, or interests; and will employ
whatever means necessary and available to undermine the process. Unlike the UN
Security Council whose operations and decisions can be constrained by the exercise of
veto power by strong and spoiler states, TGNs do not require unanimous approval from
their participants. If states do not agree with the guidelines or objectives of the TGN, they
can simply leave the network or remain without taking supporting action. By cooperating
with like-minded actors, states can achieve compliance and consensus through direct
peer-to-peer monitoring and reciprocity,88 while avoiding the challenges posed by veto
power and potential spoilers.
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H6: Issue intractability at the domestic level favours TGN-based cooperation.
Linked to international veto power and the problem of spoiler states is the
question of domestic hurdles to cooperation. International treaties with legal implications
for participant states often require formal ratification by domestic legislatures. These
domestic deliberations are generally subject to public scrutiny. Sometimes the treaties or
the decision to pursue certain strategies on particular issues can be in keeping with
domestic public and political opinion. In small arms, for instance, U.S. behaviour in
pursuit of its goals was in keeping its domestic constituencies, namely, the NRA and
weapons manufacturers.89 The U.S. used its veto power to blunt a treaty on the subject of
small arms. In military and security services, on the hand, U.S. behaviour evolved with
domestic pressures. In the wake of the incidents in Iraq and as a result of Congress
calling for more regulation, the U.S. began participating in a multi-stakeholder initiative,
where it employed productive rather than hard power.90 While TGNs are by no means
free of domestic pressures and influences, they can “pass more easily under the domestic
political radar screen.”91 Clearly, a state’s behaviour in the pursuit of its goals will still
reflect its domestic interests. However, given their somewhat secretive nature, TGNbased-cooperation, at least in the initial stages, can allow cooperation between states to
go undetected by the domestic political constituency.
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The benefits of TGN-based cooperation and the conditions under which TGNs
may form are linked to the characteristics that qualify an entity as a TGN. The lack of a
codified charter can enhance the speed of decision-making and reduce the costs of
cooperation; TGNs can adapt quickly to unanticipated changes, which in turn, lends them
more to cooperation on issues that are more volatile and unpredictable in nature; TGNs
lack an equity based decision-making structure and tend to arise from a small core group
of states that share preferences, which helps powerful states to avoid the international
veto problem and the question of spoilers; they lack of direct approval from domestic
constituencies allowing TGNs to reduce domestic-level impediments to cooperation; and
finally, TGNs allow powerful states to offer participants different terms of engagement
on the basis of their own preferences and requirements.
While all six conditions outlined above make TGN-based cooperation more
likely, we may speculate that they are not all mutually exclusive or equally weighted in
terms of their influence on TGN formation. Concentrated power in the shape of a
managerial state is the principal precondition for TGN formation, however, a decision by
U.S officials to use a TGN will also depend on whether: the relationship is anticipated to
be one-off or enduring; the issue under question is subject to uncertainty and volatility;
and/or if formal cooperation is likely to suffer from international intransigence and
domestic-level impediments. Furthermore, opportunities for heterogeneous contracting
are biconditional to the existence of a managerial state. The ability to offer participants
different terms of engagement depends upon the existence of a resource rich actor willing
to exercise productive power in the first place. Additionally, domestic distributive
conflict and the existence of domestic veto players are alone unlikely to drive TGN
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formation. TGN-based cooperation is more likely when states recognise the potential for
joint gains but disagree over the details of an international agreement.92 This
disagreement may be informed by domestic level impediments but it does not always
have to be driven by it. Thus, while all six conditions make TGN-based cooperation more
likely, they are not all equally weighted or mutually exclusive.
This chapter has assessed why TGNs like the PSI arise and take the form that they
do. I have suggested that when the U.S. decides to work through an IGO as opposed to a
TGN or vice versa, it conducts an analysis of the utility of that particular organisational
form. It takes into consideration not only the nature of the issue area under question but
also how the characteristics of each organisational form lend itself to effective
cooperation on that specific issue. Both IGOs and TGNs can constrain and shape the
behaviour of member states, while simultaneously being the object of strategic U.S.
choice. IGOs and TGNs do not necessarily have to be competitive architectures of
cooperation within a regime. As demonstrated above, TGNs provide certain benefits that
IGOs are unable to provide and vice versa. For some issue areas, TGNs may present a
better institutional design for cooperation than IGOs, while for other areas IGOs may be
more conductive for cooperation. In the next Chapter, I illustrate the dynamics and
evolution of TGN formation and cooperation by applying the TGN framework to the
non-proliferation regime and the Proliferation Security Initiative.
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Chapter Three
New Initiatives for New Threats: The Proliferation Security Initiative
The purpose of this chapter is to illustrate the dynamics and evolution of
transgovernmental networking using a recent, successful, and in some ways novel
example of transgovernmental security cooperation, the PSI. While a range of TGNs exist
within the non-proliferation regime, the PSI is of particular interest to this paper as it
represents an evolutionary step within the TGN framework. Unlike some of the
multilateral export controls which function as subsidiaries or supporting mechanisms to
the existing IGO/treaty structure, the PSI-TGN structure constitutes the political core of
cooperation over an issue that has yet to be addressed effectively via a treaty. The PSI
does not simply plug a gap in the existing regime - it acts as a functional substitute for
IGO/treaty based cooperation over a highly salient issue.
This Chapter proceeds as follows. First, it briefly discusses how the nonproliferation regime itself has evolved, tracing its evolution from formal state-oriented
treaty based arrangements such as the NPT to a range of less formal initiatives including
multilateral export control efforts and today, the PSI. I examine some of the reasons
behind why the U.S. initially opted to work through formal instruments of cooperation as
opposed to informal ones and then moved towards looser networks of cooperation. Next,
the Chapter focuses specifically on the PSI, using the 14 threshold criteria from Chapter

Two to demonstrate how the PSI qualifies as a TGN despite claims by U.S. officials that
it is an “activity not an organisation.” The PSI is also assessed against the six conditions
for TGN-based formation and cooperation to illustrate that the decision by U.S. officials
to cooperate through the PSI-TGN framework was based on a calculation of the
functional and strategic benefits that it could offer to the U.S. as opposed to a formal
arrangement. The Chapter ends by demonstrating how and why the PSI constitutes an
evolutionary step within the TGN framework.

3.1 Evolution of the Non-proliferation Regime
A regime consists of “a set of implicit or explicit norms, principles, rules, and
decision-making procedures around which actors expectations converge in a given area
of international relations.”93 Consequently, the non-proliferation regime consists of
beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude regarding the dangers of proliferating WMD to
states and non-state actors; standards of behaviour defined in terms of obligations not to
proliferation and entitlements to civil nuclear capabilities; and both formal and informal
architectures of cooperation for enforcing collective action. There exists an extensive
body of literature on why states demonstrate nuclear restraint and the factors that explain
the relatively successful record of nuclear non-proliferation. Variation in organisational
form, particularly the trend towards transgovernmental networks within the nonproliferation regime, on the other hand, remains relatively unexamined. There has also
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been an evolution in the role of TGNs, which demands a closer examination. The
objective of this Chapter is to trace, assess, and analyse the significance of these changes.

3.1.1

Core Components of the State-Oriented Non-proliferation Regime
The non-proliferation regime is made up of a constellation of elements, including

international agreements and cooperative actions aimed at curbing the spread of WMD
and advanced delivery components to states. Since the first tactical use of the atomic
bomb in Hiroshima in 1945 and evidence of the vastly destructive capabilities of
nonconventional weapons,94 horizontal WMD proliferation has been a significant concern
for the U.S. During the Cold War, the non-proliferation regime was predominantly statecentric and employed as a means of managing superpower nuclear rivalry. By limiting
the number of states that could acquire nuclear weapons, the U.S. managed the
destabilising effects that possession of nuclear technologies would have on the bipolar
system of international states.
During the past half-century and as a result of the threat of WMD terrorism, the
U.S has taken a leadership role in building and developing a non-proliferation regime
centred on the principles of deterrence and containment. Nuclear deterrence entails
security assurances to nonnuclear states in order to prevent them from acquiring nuclear
weapons in the future. Negative assurances have included “no first-use” promises in
which nuclear power states agree not to use nuclear weapons against any of the NPT
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parties that do not have nuclear weapons (with the exception of one or two).95 Positive
security assurances, on the other hand, include promises by nuclear states to seek UN
Security Council protection for nonnuclear states in the event that an enemy threatens
nonnuclear states with nuclear attack.96 The principle of nuclear containment is intended
to prevent states that already posses nuclear weapons from proliferating knowledge or
weapons to nonnuclear states.
The foundation of each of the three major components of the non-proliferation
regime (nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons) is an almost universally accepted
treaty: the NPT, which opened for signature in 1968 and entered into force in 1972; the
BWC, which opened for signature in 1972 and entered into force in 1975; and the CWC,
which opened for signature in 1993 and entered into force in 1997.97 The treaties and
formal agreements that make up the regime often include “inspection provisions, to
verify states’ compliance with the treaty’s most important provisions, and associated
export control systems.”98
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The NPT constitutes a legally binding treaty that includes an extensive inspection
system to verify that civil nuclear facilities are not being used and abused for the purpose
of weaponisation. Discussions surrounding a potential non-proliferation treaty originally
began in 1959 and received unanimous approval in the form of a 1961 resolution of the
UN General Assembly. Proposed by Ireland and revised by the General Assembly, this
resolution called for a treaty under which nuclear powers “would undertake to refrain
from relinquishing control of nuclear weapons and from transmitting the information for
their manufacture to states not possessing such weapons.”99 As a result of Cold War
disagreements and tensions between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, it took until 1968 to
negotiate and produce a final treaty draft. The treaty was eventually signed by 62
countries including the “P-5,” which were the permanent members of the UN Security
Council and the only countries permitted to have nuclear weapons among those that
joined, namely, the U.S. the Soviet Union, France, China, and the United Kingdom.
With a few notable exceptions, this regime has gained almost universal support,
and it has “gradually created a deeply etched norm against the acquisition and use of
WMD.”100 Broad support, however, does not always translate into success. A number of
key nuclear states remain outside of the non-proliferation regime or have continued to
acquire technologies that would allow them to develop nuclear weapons. Notable
examples include India and Pakistan, who declared themselves to be nuclear weapon
states in 1998; the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), who tested a nuclear
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device and claims to have a weapon in 2006; Iran, who is believed by many to have
developed a nuclear weapons program; and Israel, who is suspected to have possessed
nuclear weapons for some decades now.101
In terms of a formal structure, as of 2013, 189 states are recognised to be party to
the NPT and the treaty itself relies upon the IAEA as an institutionalised mechanism for
monitoring and setting standards. The IAEA is headquartered in Vienna, Austria; its
personnel includes a team of 2,300 multi-disciplinary professionals and support staff
drawn from more than 100 countries; programmes and budgets are set by the 35-member
Board of Governors and the General Conference of all Member States; and annual
regular budget is set by the General Conference. Both the NPT and the IAEA reflect the
state-centric formalised nature of cooperation that characterised the nuclear nonproliferation regime until recently.
The BWC is a politically binding international treaty that was signed by 171
states in 1972 and of those, it has been ratified by 155 states today. It explicitly outlaws
the development, production, and stockpiling of biological and toxin weapons in order to
exclude completely the possibility that they could be used against human beings, other
animals, or plants. Unlike the NPT, the BWC does not distinguish between the “have”
and “have not” states. It builds upon other renunciations of the use of biological weapons,
including the 1954 Brussels Treaty, the unilateral renunciation by the U.S. in 1954, and
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France in 1972.102 While the treaty is politically binding, it lacks specific monitoring,
accounting, or even enforcement provisions that are today thought to be essential
components of a treaty. Neither does it have the provisions of an international
organisation “for assisting states parties to discharge their obligations.”103 Reports of
gross violations by the USSR and Iraq led to negotiations for a legally binding
verification and compliance-promoting instrument that would strengthen the BWC in
1995. However, these negotiations collapsed in 2001 and the BWC remains a treaty
without teeth.
Finally, the 1993 CWC prohibits the development, production, and stockpiling of
chemical weapons, and requires signatories to participate in a verification system and to
institute domestic compliance-assuring measures. The treaty has now been ratified by 188
member states. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) was
established as a result of a treaty provision; it has a secretariat based at the Hague; a
trained international inspectorate of 150-200 that is independent of the member states; an
Executive Council consisting of 41 members elected by the Conference of the States
Parties; a plenary organ which has the power to oversee the implementation of the
Convention; codified rules of procedure; and a routinely identified and regularly
available budget, which is independent of any one member state.
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The NPT, BWC, and CWC are all core components of the formal state-oriented
non-proliferation regime. Other formal components include the 1963 Limited Test Ban
Treaty (LTBT), which prohibits nuclear testing everywhere but underground; the 1974
Threshold Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) and the 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaty
(PNET) which prohibit the testing of weapons underground if their explosive yield
exceeds 150 kilotons; the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which opened for
signature in 1996 but is yet to enter into force; and the five nuclear-weapon free zone
(NWFZ) treaties which cover Africa, Latin America, the Caribbean, Central Asia, the
South Pacific, and Southeast Asia and under which regional states reiterate their pledge in
the NPT not to develop nuclear weapons. Each of these regime components plays a vital
role in regulating, monitoring, and enforcing the non-proliferation norm.
Why did states choose to work through the formal instruments of cooperation as
opposed to informal ones? First, the primary targets of these regulatory efforts are states.
During the Cold War, the U.S. was concerned about the spread of nuclear technologies to
Soviet allied states, whose acquisition and development of weaponised nuclear
technologies could precipitate a change in the balance of power. By establishing legally
and politically binding prohibitions, states would not only have to deal with the
repercussions of proliferating knowledge and weapons but also punishments for receiving
technologies from proliferators.
Second, while informal cooperation relies upon each participant to implement and
enforce the agreement in accordance with domestic laws and practices, treaties often
come with international verification systems, inspection agencies, and enforcement
mechanisms. The IAEA, for instance, can refer countries to the UN Security Council (as
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it did for North Korea in 1994 and Iran in 2006); OPCW members can take collective
measures against proliferating or receiving states or refer states to the UN Security
Council; and states party to the BWC can lodge complaints with the UN Security Council
if they suspect that a state has broken its treaty obligations.
Third, treaty based cooperation can be accompanied by incentives which are
offered to all parties on an equal non-discriminatory basis. The CWC and the BWC, for
instance, offer signatory states access to peaceful chemical and biotechnology so long as
they are used for peaceful purposes. They also offer assistance to victims of a chemical or
biological attack. The NPT offers positive and negative security assurances from nuclear
states to nonnuclear states in the event of a threat of attack from another nuclear state.
States can also negotiate on the basis of aid for civil nuclear energy, as long as they can
demonstrate that their programmes are being used for peaceful purposes. This may be
more attractive to signatories as they are all explicitly made aware of the terms of
engagement when they sign up. Finally, unlike TGNs, which are generally ad hoc in
nature, treaties are intended to be instruments with longer-lasting implications for
signatory states. While not explicitly prohibited, treaty denunciations and withdrawals are
often frowned upon and send a powerful signal of non-compliance. Of course, there are a
number of examples of countries withdrawing from treaties. In 2001 President Bush
withdrew from the 1971 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty after almost 30 years of
being party to it. The U.S. withdrew on the premise that the ABM hindered its ability to
develop ways to protect its citizens from terrorists or rogue state missile attacks. The
nature of the threat had changed, thus, the U.S. no longer felt that the ABM provided an
adequate mechanism for dealing with the new threat. However, the decision to pull out
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from the treaty was not without fierce political debate within Washington and around the
world. Two days prior to U.S. withdrawal, 31 House of Representative members
registered their opposition to pulling out of the treaty, arguing that President Bush could
not act alone. There was also opposition around the world, with Russian President
Vladimir Putin calling the decision to abandon the treaty a “mistake.”104 Chinese
President Jiang Zemin expressed the greatest concern over U.S. withdrawal, and stated
that he “looked forward to further high-level dialogue on the topic.”105 Withdrawal from
an internationally accepted treaty thus is not an easy process. While sometimes desirable
or necessary, treaties are intended to be lasting architectures of cooperation.
While treaties and IGOs lie at the core of the non-proliferation regime, TGNs like
the multilateral export control initiatives have also played an important role in supporting
the traditional state-centric framework. It would be factually inaccurate to suggest that
TGNs are an entirely new feature of the non-proliferation regime, gaining prominence
only after the fall of the Soviet Union and the events of 9/11. TGNs have played in a
critical role in supporting treaties such as the NPT, CWC, and BWC for a number of
years. They provide technical assistance, plug gaps, and set standards. While the final
section of this chapter will address the evolution of TGNs in greater detail, it is worth at
this point detailing the type and role of TGNs that existed prior to the PSI and as
subsidiaries to the existing regime.
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Since the 1970s and in response to the growing number of states capable of
supplying equipment, material, or technology needed for the production of WMD, groups
of supplier states have come together to establish informal TGNs that reinforce and
expand the national export controls required by the non-proliferation treaties.106 These
networks include the NSG, which was founded in 1976 and includes 45 member states;
the AG, which was founded in 1985 and has gained support from 41 member states; and
the MTCR, which was founded in 1987 and has 34 partners. The NSG covers transfers
relating to nuclear materials, the AG covers chemical and biological related transfers, and
the MTCR was established to limit the spread of ballistic and cruise missiles. Other
export control initiatives include the NEP (Zangger Committee), which stems from the
NPT and the Wassenaar Arrangement, which was founded in 1996 and has 41
participating states. The Zangger Committee concerns safeguards on nuclear exports,
while the Wassenaar Arrangement focuses on transfers in conventional arms and dual-use
goods and technologies.
The purpose of these supplier networks is to develop and maintain guidelines for
national export controls, “including general standards for issuing export licenses and
“core lists” of controlled items that might contribute to the manufacture of the respective
WMD and advanced deliver systems.”107 They support the existing structure by plugging
regulatory gaps and setting standards. As Spector notes, these supplier organisations have
developed informal rules regarding the admission of new members, including, the
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requirement that new members have to be in good standing with existing state-oriented
treaties like the NPT, CWC, or BWC.108 Countries outside of these groups have
complained that these arrangements are discriminatory as they restrict their rights to have
access to peaceful nuclear, chemical, and biological technology.109 While these supplier
groups meet the TGN criteria, they are nonetheless, closely tied to the state-centric nonproliferation regime.

Diagram (A): TGNs in the Traditional Non-proliferation Regime

Treaty

IGO

TGN

TGN

Diagram A above illustrates the position of TGNs within the traditional statecentric non-proliferation regime. The core component of this regime is a set of widely
adopted international treaties. These treaties are supported, enforced, and monitored by
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IGOs. TGNs like the multilateral export and supplier groups, in this model are auxiliary
components. While they do not have a formal treaty basis, they are nonetheless closely
affiliated with the treaty/IGO regime – plugging technical and regulatory gaps that the
existing structure is unable to effectively address. As the next section will demonstrate,
TGNs within the non-proliferation regime have evolved to become sources of decisionmaking within themselves - independent of the existing structure.

3.1.2

New Regime Components to Meet New Threats
Many have raised doubts about the viability of Cold War-era regulatory

instruments to effectively combat the spread of WMD to state and non-state actors.
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and in the wake of September 11 2001
attacks, the U.S. has reoriented its non-proliferation policy to target non-state actors
particularly terrorist groups and rogue states supplying weapons to terrorist networks.
Guy B. Roberts argues that today, the U.S and its allies face a considerably more
complicated, diffuse, rapidly changing, multifaceted, and threatening security
environment than the Cold War nuclear confrontation.110 During the Cold War, nonproliferation treaties were strictly a state-to-state endeavour. Agreements were negotiated
by states, approved by state legislatures and implemented by instruments of state
power.111 Today “nations that clandestinely seek WMD also are the same countries that
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support terrorist groups.”112 Of particular concern are those terrorist groups who are
sponsored or funded by states and who lack a geographic home, infrastructure or
identifiable population that can be threatened.113 How do you craft an effective deterrence
strategy if you do not know whom, what, and where your strategy should be directed?
The discovery of the nuclear weapons related trafficking network the A.Q Khan network
has provided considerable evidence to support the assertion that there exist other
organisations that are actively pursuing WMD. Roberts refers to the network of these
actors as the ‘secondary proliferation market,’ which exists beyond the scope of
traditional arms control treaties, directed primarily at states.114
The chosen vehicle for implementing this new policy is not a formal IGO or a
treaty; rather, it is increasingly a flexible and decentralised transgovernmental network.
While non-proliferation treaties and agreements still enjoy near-universal compliance, the
remote possibility of WMD terrorism has forced states to cooperate through looser and
easily adaptable arrangements that are deemed to be more suitable to today’s diverse and
unpredictable threats.
As Diagram B illustrates, TGNs are no longer just a subsidiary component to the
existing treaty/IGO structure. TGNs like the PSI have evolved to a stage where they, in
and of themselves, constitute the political core of cooperation. These new TGNs work
alongside the traditional state-centric regime to create a network of networks. They are
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also supported by and have given birth to a number of other TGNs like the CSI and the
SFI, which interact with the wider non-proliferation regime. Having discussed the stateoriented components of the non-proliferation regime and the trend towards non-state
actors and looser cooperative arrangements, I now turn to the PSI as a case study of
successful transgovernmental security networking and cooperation.

Diagram (B): New Non-proliferation Regime
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3.2 Case Study: The Proliferation Security Initiative
Launched by President George W. Bush at the G-8 meeting in Krakow, Poland on
May 31, 2003, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is now in its tenth year of
operation. Announcing its launch, President Bush said:
“When weapons of mass destruction or their components are in transit, we
must have the means and authority to seize them. So today I announce a new
effort to fight proliferation called the Proliferation Security Initiative. The United
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States and a number of our close allies, including, Poland, have begun working on
new agreements to search planes and ships carrying suspect cargo and to seize
illegal weapons or missile technologies. Over time, we will extend this
partnership as broadly as possible to keep the world’s most destructive weapons
away from our shores and out of the hands of common enemies.”115

U.S. involvement in the initiative was bold and timely. It stemmed from an
incident with a North Korean vessel known as the So San. On December 9, 2002, U.S.
and Spanish naval forces interdicted a vessel heading to Yemen in the Arabian Sea. It is
reported that the U.S. had intelligence that this vessel was carrying cargo related to Scud
ballistic missiles. Although the ship originated from North Korea, it was not flying under
a North Korean flag. Neither was there a ship under the name of So San in the North
Korean registry. Under the UN Convention of the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS), the vessel
was stateless and thus subject to interception and boarding by warships on the high
seas.116 UNCLOS states that interdiction is permissible where reasonable grounds exist to
suspect a ship of statelessness, engaging in slave trade, shipping narcotic drugs or
psychotropic substances, committing unauthorised broadcasting, or piracy.117 The
statelessness of the So San and the belief that the ship was carrying WMD cargo was
thought to justify the U.S. and Spain taking interdictory action. As soon as the ship
reached the waters patrolled by a pre-existing Combined Task Force (CTF), the U.S.
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Navy asked the Spanish navy to stop and search the vessel. The vessel’s captain refused
to stop and allow the Spanish navy to board the vessel, as a result of which, Spanish
Naval personnel forcibly boarded the ship by helicopter. U.S. Naval personnel joined
soon after. The So San’s manifest stated that the cargo contained bags of cement but
underneath those bags of cement lay a proliferation cargo of 15 Scud missiles, 15
conventional warheads, 23 containers of nitric acid fuel, and 85 barrels of initially
unidentified chemical, later described as an oxidizer for the missile fuel.118
On December 11, this example of successful interdiction and intelligence sharing
turned to failure. The U.S. had no legal basis for retaining the cargo. As the interdiction
became public and received media attention, U.S. officials were forced to release the
vessel and to allow the ship to resume safe passage to Yemen. Despite a commitment by
the government of Yemen that it was not going to purchase any more Scud missiles from
North Korea, the Yemeni President, on December 10, complained that the missiles,
warheads, and fuel were Yemen’s property and that the So San should be allowed to
proceed to Yemen without interruption.119 Former U.S. Government officials believe that
had details of the interdiction remained secret, the Yemeni government would have
accepted the interdiction and the cargo would have remained in the hands of the U.S.120
However, upon release of details surrounding the incident, it became politically
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unfeasible for the Yemeni government to accept the seizure of their property by U.S. and
Spanish officials.121
In a statement announcing the release of the So San, White House Press Secretary
Ari Fleischer noted:
“There is no provision under international law prohibiting Yemen from
accepting delivery of missiles from North Korea. While there is authority to stop
and search, in this instance there is no clear authority to seize the shipment of
Scud missiles from North Korea to Yemen. And therefore, the merchant vessel is
being released.
...
One thing that this does underscore is the need to take a look-and we will
do so, with friends and others around the world-in a diplomatic sense about
whether or not the international regimes that deal with missile proliferation need a
second look.”122
Coincidentally, on the same day that details of the So San incident were released,
the U.S. government also published its 2002 National Strategy to Combat Weapons of
Mass Destruction, which placed an increased emphasis on managing the consequences of
WMD use and combating proliferation once it already occurred.123 As Koch notes, this
publication departed from earlier declaratory policy by addressing policies and actions to
counter proliferation before addressing ones to prevent it.124 The 2002 National Strategy
to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction states that:
“We know from experience that we cannot always be successful in
preventing and containing the proliferation of WMD to hostile states and
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terrorists. Therefore, U.S. military and appropriate civilian agencies must possess
the full range of operational capabilities to counter the threat and use of WMD by
states and terrorists against the United States, our military forces, and friends, and
allies.”125

Growing awareness of the dangers of WMD proliferation during the 1990s and
after the fall of the Soviet Union became a profound concern following the terrorist
attacks of 9/11 and the U.S. anthrax attacks of fall 2001. These events not only
highlighted the power and capabilities of non-state actors such as Al-Qaeda but also the
growing reach of and interconnectedness of terrorist organisations with criminal
networks. In recent years, for the right price, black-market operatives, such as the A.Q.
Khan network have been willing to use their knowledge and personal connections to
provide terrorist organisations with delivery systems through which to transit WMD and
related materials.126 Although WMD were not used in 9/11 attacks and anthrax attacks of
fall 2001 were unsuccessful, they did provide overwhelming evidence in support of the
claim that terrorist groups were actively pursuing WMD and that if they acquired such
capabilities, they would readily use them.127 Moreover, the terrorist groups and criminal
networks discussed here are beyond the scope of traditional arms control treaties and
export control TGNs, which are directed primarily towards state actors. At the time, there
were few, if any provisions in the non-proliferation legal framework addressing the threat
posed by nonstate actors. In recognition of this lacuna within the existing non-
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proliferation regime, the 2002 National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass
Destruction highlighted the need for an effective interdiction mechanism in order to
prevent to movement of WMD materials, technology, and expertise to hostile states and
terrorist organisations.128 From the U.S. perspective, the PSI would act as an important
tool in the international effort to break-up black-markets and to detect and intercept
WMD materials in transit.
The Obama administration continued to demonstrate a commitment to the PSI.
The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report reaffirmed President Obama’s pledge to make
the PSI “a durable international institution” through which countries could “coordinate,
share intelligence, and build capacity to interdict WMD related transfers.”129 According
to the U.S. Department of State (DOS), the PSI provides committed states with a
“framework for coordinating counterproliferation activities to thwart proliferators’
increasingly sophisticated tactics.”130 Unlike traditional formal organisations, the PSI
does not necessitate the creation of new laws or regulations: the interdictions are carried
out under existing national regulations. The precise number of desired, attempted, and
successful interdictions through the PSI is shrouded in operational secrecy. However, in
July 2006, Under Secretary Robert Joseph said that PSI had “played a key role in helping
to interdict more than 30 shipments,”131 and it had been credited with successfully
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interdicting WMD parts to Iran and publicly exposing the A.Q. Khan network and
Libya’s WMD program.132
In press statements, U.S. public officials are keen to remind participant states that
the PSI constitutes an activity and not an organisation. The initiative’s efforts are not
aimed at one country but instead at halting the global traffic in proliferation related items.
There is no formal treaty or decision-making mechanism and no governing body,
headquarters, or membership application. Members are referred to as “participants” and
membership as “endorsement.” The Statement of Interdiction Principles (SIP) is not a
formal treaty; rather, it represents a political commitment to establish best practices to
tackle proliferation.133 Yet the defining characteristics of the PSI fit the criteria for a
TGN. While the PSI is not an organisation in the formal sense, it nonetheless constitutes
an informal architecture of cooperation. The next section will assess the PSI against the
14 TGN threshold criteria outlined in Chapter Two, with the objective of demonstrating
that the PSI not only constitutes a TGN but it also represents an evolution in the TGN
framework. The Chapter will then examine the PSI in relation to the six conditions for
TGN-based formation and cooperation as a means of outlining the functional and
strategic benefits that the PSI-TGN could offer the U.S as opposed to a more formal
structure.
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3.2.1

The PSI as a Transgovernmental Network

1. Membership Base
The membership criterion for a TGN refers to the number of states in the network,
whether these states share preferences, the type of actors participating, and whom these
actors represent. The PSI was the brainchild of a number of mid-level U.S. government
officials. The task to analyse the implications of the So San case was given to an
Interdiction Sub-Policy Coordinating Committee (Sub-PCC), chaired by Brendan Melley,
Director for Proliferation Strategy on the NSC staff. A number of agencies, including the
U.S. DOS, the Joint Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Departments of Treasury (DOT), Department of Justice
(DOJ), and Department of Commerce (DOC), and the DHS worked closely to analyse the
events surrounding the interdiction. Once the analysis had been completed, the Sub-PCC
began drafting the proposed PSI rules of interdiction, which were then approved by the
Proliferation Strategy PCC.
The NSC staff invited eight like-minded liberal democratic governments to join the
PSI. These governments were also members of the “coalition of the willing” in Iraq,
specifically, Australia, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, and the
United Kingdom.134 To this list of eight countries, President Bush added two more:
France and Germany. These two countries had a pre-existing relationship with the U.S.
on proliferation issues.135 This group of 11 states came to be known as the PSI “Core
Group.” Most of these countries were longstanding allies. As Koch notes,
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“9 were North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members, 6 were in the G-8,
and 8 were in the European Union (EU). Of the non-NATO members, Australia had
long and close alliance ties with the United Kingdom and the United States, and
Japan with the United States.”
The shared preferences, objectives, and familiarity allowed this set of proliferation
experts to work quickly and effectively to translate the PSI draft proposals into reality.
The first meeting took place in Madrid on June 12, 2003 – this was less than two weeks
after President Bush’s PSI announcement in Krakow and less than 6 months after the So
San events. Once the core group had agreed on the SIP, John Bolton, Under Secretary of
State for Arms Control and International Security contacted the Russian and Chinese
governments. While the Russian government accepted the invitation for participation, the
Chinese government did not. By Spring 2004, the Core Group had expanded to 15 states,
with the addition of Canada, Norway, Singapore, and Russia. This would be the last time
that they would meet as a Core Group. By March 2004, the number of participants grew
to over 60; by June 2006 membership stood at over 75; by May 2008 it was at 91; by
September 2010 membership was at 98 states; and by April 2013, it was 102 (see
appendix for a list of PSI participants). The PSI began as a core group of like-minded
states that worked closely to draft policies and set agendas. Once the basic rules of
interdiction had been agreed upon, membership was extended to a wider participant base.
With regards to the type of actors and whom these actors represent, the PSI is strictly
a sub-state affair. The initiative is populated by experts as opposed to generalist
diplomats or heads of state. Initially, representatives included individuals like William
Ehrman, Director General for Defence and Intelligence in the United Kingdom Foreign
Office, who had a long been engaged in countering WMD and missile proliferation.
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During negotiations, Ehrman also lead a small group of U.S. and UK officials who were
working to counter the A.Q Khan nuclear proliferation network.136 Stanislas de
Laboulaye, Deputy Secretary General, Director General of Political Affairs and Security
in the French Foreign Ministry was also closely involved in counterproliferation efforts,
particularly regarding Iran. Today, the PSI has become an even more specialised
endeavour with diplomatic, military, law enforcement, legal, and intelligence experts
meeting on a regular basis to exchange information and conduct training exercises.
Although PSI participants have held meetings with IGOs such as NATO, the World
Health Organization (WHO), and the World Customs Organization (WCO), there
remains work to be done in this area.137 At present, IGOs and NGOs have little
involvement in this initiative. Thus, the PSI meets all four criteria under the membership
sub-heading: it initially began as a core group of like minded states; membership was
later expanded to the wider community; the participant base constitutes mid-level
officials and experts (sub-state units); and membership has been limited to state
representatives as opposed or NGOs or IGOs.

2. Rules of Governance
Under the heading rules of governance fall five specific threshold criteria relating to
the HQ/secretariat, staffing presence, staffing independence, meetings and the decisionmode of a TGN. Unlike an IGO, the PSI lacks a codified charter outlining its objective
136
137

Koch, p. 11
Roberts, Guy, Interview, March 26, 2013

72

and organisational structure. The crux of the PSI lies in the 2003 SIP, which identifies
vague steps that participants should take to effectively interdict shipments carrying WMD
or related materials, “consistent with national legal authorities and relevant international
law and frameworks.”138 When participants extend support to the PSI, they endorse the
broad principles outlined below:
•

Undertake effective measures, either alone or in concert with other states, for
interdicting the transfer or transport of WMD, their delivery systems, and
related materials to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation
concern;

•

Share information about suspect proliferation activity and dedicate appropriate
resources and efforts to interdiction operations and capabilities;

•

Strengthen national legal authorities and international legal frameworks to
support the initiative’s commitments; and

•

Take specific actions in support of interdiction efforts, including, not
transporting or assisting in the transport of any such cargoes; taking action to
board and search any vessel flying their flag; and seriously considering
providing consent under the appropriate circumstances to the boarding and
searching of its own flag vessels by other states;
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The initiative is promoted as a channel for land, air, and sea interdiction cooperation
outside of treaties and multilateral export control regimes.139 It is a pro-active
enforcement mechanism to prevent the spread of nuclear, biological and chemical
weapons. As a voluntary organisation without a codified charter or rules of governance,
the PSI avoids some of the pitfalls of existing counter-proliferation efforts, which have
included prolonged periods of inactivity due to potential bureaucratic hurdles. There is no
PSI HQ or secretariat. There is a small central mechanism to help coordinate the
Initiative’s activities. However, this mechanism is attached to the United States. During
the May 2009 Global and Western Hemisphere Operational Experts Group (OEG) and
Outreach Meeting, the U.S. proposed the designation of a PSI focal point.140 In
November 2010, this proposal was formally adopted by the OEG in Tokyo. The U.S. now
acts as a central administrative point of contact for disseminating documents, agendas,
and schedules. Unlike a formal IGO, where the staff is independent of a particular
country, PSI’s personnel are drawn from and are part of the U.S. government.
With regards to meetings and decision-mode, there is no formal agreement as to when
participants should meet and how decisions should be made. In the year that followed the
official launch of the PSI, the Core Group met on five separate occasions and in five
different cities - Madrid, Brisbane, Paris, London, and Lisbon. As the number of
participants grew, the frequency of their meetings declined. PSI participants met in
Krakow in June 2004, Warsaw in June 2006, and Washington in May 2008. Meetings
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with all PSI participants have become symbolic and ceremonial affairs as opposed to
meaningful sources of political deliberation.
The only regular PSI meetings are those held by the OEG. This group includes
military, intelligence, law enforcement, legal, and diplomatic experts who work together
to translate the SIP into action. When the OEG was first established, it met three to five
times in a plenary, with additional regional meetings and workshops.141 Recent meetings
were held in Tokyo in November 2010, Hawaii in June 2011, Berlin in November 2011,
and Seoul in September 2012. Decisions at these meetings are made on the basis of
deliberation and consensus. On the other hand, the SIP was drafted unilaterally by the
United States. Bolton told members that the statement could evolve over time and that
they had the opportunity to submit revisions and drafts.142 However, as the managing
power, the U.S. would have the ability to oppose any changes to the statement. The PSI
thus meets the TGN rules of governance criteria. It has no HQ/secretariat; the staff are
attached to a particular country; meetings are regularised, however they are not specified;
and there is no formal decision-making structure - decisions are either made unilaterally
by the managing power or by deliberation and consensus.

3. Budget
The TGN budget criterion refers to the amount of funding the entity receives, the
mechanism for the provision of this funding, and the source. Unlike an IGO that must
141
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have sufficient funds to cover minimal staffing and operation, a funding mechanism that
is routinely identified and regularly available, and a source that is not controlled by
another IGO or one state, the PSI has none of the above. The PSI has an unspecified
budget, an unspecified funding mechanism, and a source that is controlled predominantly
by one state – the United States. The U.S. Congressional Research Service (CRS) report
on the PSI notes that funds for PSI activities remain in large part a component of other
U.S. programmes that address WMD proliferation and interdiction – the PSI does not
have separate budget lines.143 While the DOD includes a breakdown of costs exclusively
dedicated to the PSI in its annual report to Congress, there are other DOD programmes
which also contribute to PSI efforts but are not included under the PSI umbrella. For
example, the U.S. Strategic Command budgets for combatant commanders’ participation
in WMD interdiction exercises are not included in its report to Congress.144 In addition,
the State Department’s FY2012 and FY2013 congressional budget stated that the
Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund (NDF) could be used to support exercises such
as the PSI, while U.S. staff travel to PSI meetings would be drawn the DOS’s general
operating accounts.145 The CRS report notes further that participation by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS)
Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) is funded on an ad hoc basis.146 The Department of
Energy’s (DOE) budget includes funds for National Laboratory research on WMD
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interdiction technologies, which would also contribute to PSI efforts.147

While

participant states may have their own domestic budget lines, the PSI lacks a pooled
budget or funding mechanism. The U.S coordinates and bankrolls the majority of PSI
excises, while the individual participants cover their individual delegation’s expenditures.

4. Legal Basis
While most IGOs have a treaty basis, the PSI was not established through a legally
binding treaty. As Durkalec notes, “a blueprint of the PSI’s activities and a clarification
of what it means to be a PSI partner were included in the Statement of Interdiction
Principles (SIP).”148 However, the initiative itself was not derived from a treaty. It began
as a political understanding between the U.S. and likeminded allies and then expanded to
include a range of other countries. Although the PSI exists alongside treaties such as the
NPT, the BWC and the CWC, it is not directly connected or derived from them. Many
have suggested that while the PSI does not have a legal basis, it is nonetheless intended
“to be an embryo of a new legal regime.”149 Lobsinger, for instance, argues that the PSI’s
SIP laid the foundation for the Security Council Resolution 1540 on April 28, 2004.150
This Resolution calls for all states to: (1) refrain from providing support to nonstates
147
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seeking WMD; (2) adopt laws prohibiting nonstate actors from acquiring WMD; and, (3)
take measures to prevent proliferation.151 Resolution 1540 is ambitious in its scope, as it
requires all states to pass domestic legislation to support its objectives. While it does not
directly refer to the PSI, the Resolution originated in a proposal that was made by
President Bush to the General Assembly in September 2003. In this proposal, Bush
discussed the PSI and called upon the Security Council to “adopt a new anti-proliferation
resolution…[that would] call on all members of the U.N. to criminalise the proliferation
of weapons – WMD.”152 So while the PSI was not established through a legally binding
treaty, it laid the foundations for a range of other legally and politically binding
agreements.

5. Scope
Whereas IGOs may have the capacity to simultaneously address a range of global
issues, TGNs tend to be confined to a few select, narrow, issue-specific problems. These
do not necessarily have to be highly complex issues with low political salience. The PSI
was formed to deal with an issue that was both technical in nature and of high political
salience. While non-proliferation norms concerning the spread of WMD, their delivery
systems, and related materials command almost universal support, norms regarding
interdiction of ships and vessels on the high seas are far more controversial and
politically salient, as was illustrated by the So San case. As a U.S-promoted initiative
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with enduring concerns regarding its legitimacy and legality, the PSI has failed to garner
endorsement from key states, including India, Pakistan, China, Malaysia and Indonesia.
For instance, many have suggested that countries like India have been deterred from
joining the PSI as a result of the initiative’s weak legal basis and the absence of UN
oversight. One important legal stumbling block for India’s participation in the PSI is the
discriminatory distinction between NPT and non-NPT states in Article 3 bis of the 2005
Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation (SUA Convention). This Protocol criminalises and requires the
prohibition of transport of any biological, chemical, or nuclear weapon or related
materials intended to be used in a nuclear activity not under IAEA Comprehensive
Safeguards Agreement.153 India is not a party to the NPT, and thus as Thomas notes,
“carrying of any BCN weapon or its technology by a ship registered in India will be a
crime and the same cargo, if carried by a US-registered ship to India will not be a
crime.”154 A further concern is whether the PSI infringes on the right to innocent passage
as outlined in UNCLOS. While there exist no official documents stating so, India’s
concerns also supposedly stem from its NPT status as a non-signatory state, and its
maltreatment at the hands of the Nuclear Suppliers Group after the 1974 Peaceful
Nuclear Explosion and the 1998 nuclear tests.155 Joining the PSI, the de facto
enforcement arm of a system that is perceived to have unjustly targeted India in the past
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is politically unpalatable for India’s leadership. Thus, the scope of the PSI while technical
and narrow is still politically salient.
The above discussion has demonstrated that despite adamant claims by U.S.
government officials that the PSI constitutes an activity, not an organisation, this
initiative clearly meets the TGN threshold criteria outlined in Chapter Two. It also
provides a case study of transgovernmental networking within international security, a
policy area that is traditionally dominated by executive level formal cooperation. In the
next section, I use the elements outlined above to provide an analysis of the drivers of
PSI formation and cooperation.

3.2.2

Drivers of PSI Formation & Cooperation
In Chapter Two, I outlined six hypotheses about why TGNs arise and take the

form that they do. I argued that while widely quoted and generic benefits of TGN-based
cooperation such as flexibility, speed, and low transaction costs are important, they are
not the only factors that explain why TGNs arise. There are additional conditions for
TGN-based cooperation, including the relationship between power and networked
governance and the nature of the issue under question. I will now examine these
hypotheses using the PSI in order to illustrate the dynamics and evolution of TGN-based
cooperation.
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H1: TGN-based cooperation is more likely to occur when there is concentrated
power within an issue area, that is, the presence of a resource rich actor willing to
exercise managerial power in a productive way.
Concentrated power was a critical factor in driving PSI formation and in
sustaining TGN-based cooperation. Given the leadership role that the U.S. has played in
shaping non-proliferation policy over the last half-century, its wide ranging naval
capabilities, the events of 9/11 and the intersection between radicalisation, criminal
networks, and technology, as well as the embarrassment generated by the So San
incident, the Bush administration placed great priority on cultivating a new mechanism
for cooperation that could prevent such failures in the future. From the very outset, the
U.S. assumed the role of a quasi-imperial manager - setting agendas, directing
negotiations, and coordinating action. It was U.S. officials that were tasked with
analysing the lessons learnt from the So San case and drafting a Statement of Interdiction
Proposals; it was the U.S. NSC that identified the governments to be invited to implement
the PSI proposal; it was Bolton and Melley who attended all Core Group meetings and
had responsibility for keeping tabs on the draft rules of the road and reporting cables; and
it was President Bush who announced the launch of the PSI in Krakow as opposed to the
head of state of another country. While the U.S engaged with a range of stakeholders via
soft law arrangements, it also used versions of hegemonic power to steer the PSI in a
direction that best suited its objectives. For example, during the first day of the Paris
meeting in September 2003, Bolton informed governments that if they were not yet ready
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to endorse the SIP, the United States would take their names off the list.156 Despite some
reservations, all Core Group members endorsed the SIP. According to an interview Susan
Koch conducted with Melley, Bolton’s approach that day constituted “a blustery, highhanded move that worked.”157
More recently, the U.S. has bankrolled and managed the PSI, leading a number of
interdiction exercises. In June 2011, the OEG also approved a U.S. proposal to undertake
a Critical Capabilities and Practices (CCP) initiative. In describing this initiative, the U.S.
DOS said:
“OEG Countries who volunteer to participate in the CCP effort will do so
by identifying and sharing tools and resources that support interdiction related
activities and by conducting events in a coordinated manner to develop,
implement, and exercise CCPs.”158
The CCP will reportedly span across a range of interdiction related requirements,
including legal frameworks, identification and inspection, seizure and disposal and rapid
decision-making.159 By launching initiatives such as the CCP and by funding PSI
exercises, the U.S. has ensured that it remains the focal point of this TGN. Without the
U.S. exercising concentrated yet productive managerial power, it is unlikely that the PSI
would have come about or remained active.
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H2: TGN-based cooperation favours issues where there are opportunities for
heterogeneous contracting by the managerial power.
Bi-conditional to the existence of a resource-rich actor willing to exercise
productive managerial power is the presence of opportunities for heterogeneous
contracting by this power. Powerful actors like the U.S. are more likely to favour TGNbased cooperation if they are not obligated to offer participants the same terms of
engagement. At the same time, these participants may have different motivations for
participating in the TGN. The PSI is no exception. The NSC staff selected players that
had close ties to the U.S and that were likely to support U.S. efforts on interdiction
despite the potential domestic and international political costs to their government. The
initial eight Core Group members were all part of the coalition of the willing in Iraq and
had publicly committed to countering proliferation in the name of combating terrorism.
For instance, the day after 9/11, the U.S invoked the principle of Article 5, that is, the
NATO self-defence charter, which states that if one member state is under attack, all
other member nations are to come to its defence.160 Seven of the initial eight Core Group
were NATO members had supported the invocation of Article 5. Although France and
Germany were also NATO members and backed the use of Article 5 in 2001, by 2003
they actively disagreed with the U.S. on the subject of intervention in Iraq. The U.S. used
this as an opportunity for France and Germany to demonstrate that the two countries were
still willing partners in the fight against terrorism and WMD proliferation. The move to
include France and Germany was as much a functional necessity given their material
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capabilities, as it was a test - an opportunity for both countries to demonstrate that they
were still partnered with the U.S. on critical issues. The U.S was more inclined to favour
TGN-based cooperation on this particular issue as it had the opportunity to contract
partners according to its own need and terms of engagement.

H3: TGN formation is most likely when there are short time horizons.
Short time horizons in this instance refer to situations in which the cooperative
arrangement is expected address a one-off problem or the issue under question requires a
quick response. The PSI’s objective was to address the proliferation threat promptly.
While there were already a number of IGO initiatives aimed at defusing proliferation
incentives, including a series of committees and working groups established by NATO,
the U.S. felt that these initiatives were inadequate in dealing with the current and rapidly
changing proliferation threats. Alternatively, as Eilstrup-Sangiovanni notes, the U.S
could have opted to reinforce the existing treaty base regime. States might seek an
amendment to UNCLOS that would make WMD proliferation a criminal offence and
grant a mandate for interdiction of WMD-related shipments.161 However, treaties are
slow and cumbersome to amend. UNCLOS, for instance, took almost 10 years to
negotiate and a further 12 years to enter into force.
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which have a wider scope of cooperation, the PSI was intended to form the political core
of cooperation over one specific issue – interdiction on the high seas. The PSI is not
simply another mechanism for discussing issues that have already been addressed
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through the NPT, the CWC, the BWC, the IAEA, and the export control TGNs. Rather, it
is intended to address a critical fissure in the global non-proliferation regime, which
would have been difficult to manage through a more formal mechanism. The PSI was
formed as a response to short time horizons – the need to address a one off problem
quickly.

H4: Issue volatility and uncertainty favour TGN-based cooperation
A fourth driver for TGN-based cooperation is issue volatility and uncertainty.
U.S. officials were looking to build a system of cooperation that could respond to
unpredictable threats quickly and effectively. The nature of the threat posed by terrorist
networks is unpredictable and malleable. By the time states have negotiated a formal
treaty based arrangement to deal with the problem, the threat may have escalated and the
solution now requires considerable amending. The So San incident was a source of major
embarrassment for the Bush administration but more importantly, it demonstrated that the
U.S. desperately needed an international cooperative infrastructure that would help to
inhibit and interdict the spread of WMD materials to rogue states and terrorist networks.
While the technical problem that required overcoming was the So San incident, the
impetus for a new interdiction mechanism was in fact the threat of WMD terrorism,
driven by the failure of the state-centric treaty based regime to adequately address or
reduce this threat. It is also critical to note that the while a new interdiction mechanism
was essential; the U.S. did not have the time to build an entirely new international legal
framework. U.S. officials were uncertain about how a multilateral treaty concerning the
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interdiction of ships suspected of proliferating WMD related components would affect its
own interests and the interests of its allies. The legal foundation of the global transport of
American forces and military hardware is the exclusive flag state jurisdiction outlined in
UNCLOS.163 By negotiating an international treaty that would grant states reciprocal
stop-and-search powers, the U.S. would also subject its own ships to scrutiny by
foreigners. Moreover, Article 51 of the UN Charter does not authorise the use of force on
the basis of threat perception. Interdiction on the basis of suspicion that a ship is carrying
WMD related materials would amount to the use of force under the UN Charter. Unless
such interdiction is carried out with the express consent of the flag state or by the flag
state itself, it constitutes an act of war and aggression. The PSI gets around the problems
stemming from uncertainty and issue volatility through a number of ways. First, it is
flexible and easily adaptable, which means that as the threat changes so can the solution
and the framework of cooperation. Second, participants are not required to undertake a
formal legal commitment. Instead, they make a political commitment that is consistent
with relevant national and international laws. While the U.S. may have difficulty
circumventing international laws, it can, however, shape loose political commitments to
fit its own interest, thereby avoiding the possibility of having its own ships being
searched by participant countries. Finally, by encouraging 102 states to endorse the PSI
and by signing ship boarding agreements that are modelled after similar arrangements in
the counter-narcotics arena, the U.S. has laid down procedures which enable it to board,
search, and detain the cargo without being accused of war-mongering or aggression. In
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the case of the PSI, issue volatility and uncertainty thus lent them towards TGN-based
cooperation.

H5: TGN-based cooperation is more likely if the issue is susceptible to
intransigence at the international level.
One can expect TGN-based cooperation if the issue area under consideration is
unlikely to receive quick and extensive cooperation through the treaty/IGO-based regime.
The non-proliferation issue area, particularly, interdiction on the basis of suspicion that a
ship is carrying WMD related materials, is no exception. International treaties often
suffer from spoilers and are liable to founder under opposition and veto by powerful
states. There are also concerns regarding the potential for an overly expansive
interpretation or understanding of what an authorisation of forcible interdiction could
mean. China, for instance, has yet to endorse the PSI and it has repeatedly refused to
condone international interdiction. It was Chinese resistance that lead to all references of
interdiction being removed from the UN Security Council Resolution 1540. As early as
1994, there were international political disagreements regarding how to develop a more
comprehensive interdiction policy. During the North Atlantic Council negotiations, the
U.K and France favoured a joint political and military approach, while a number of other
European countries believed that the traditional non-proliferation regime was adequate
and naval action constituted an unnecessary offensive action.164 Such divergent views are
likely to replicate themselves and constitute an obstacle to negotiations when it comes to
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a formal agreement. Voluntary cooperation through a political agreement as opposed to a
legally-binding treaty allows the U.S to successfully sidestep the spoiler issue and
overcome intransigence at the international level.

H6: Issue intractability at the domestic level favours TGN-based cooperation
Finally, issue divisiveness and intractability at the domestic level also lends itself
to TGN-based cooperation. International treaties that have legal implications for
participating states often require formal ratification by domestic legislatures. TGNs like
the PSI, on the other hand, do not require domestic legislative approval. A legally binding
treaty would have generated concern and widespread scepticism from the U.S. Navy and
American shipping lobbies who defend the requirement of flag state consent and oppose
reciprocal stop-and-search agreements. Such a legally binding and enforceable document
might subject U.S private and public vessels, ships, and cargos to checks by other
countries upon suspicion that they might be carrying WMD related materials. The loose
political commitment generated by the PSI, on the other hand, is consistent with national
and international legal frameworks. It simply calls upon states to strengthen their own
domestic mechanisms and to take action in support of them. Furthermore, the PSI is
shrouded in operational secrecy which allows the details of cooperation between states to
go undetected by the domestic political constituencies. PSI exercises are not publicly
reported upon and the precise number of desired, attempted, and successful interdictions
through the PSI is unknown. Even at the outset, the White House staff was keen to avoid
media leaks, as any advance public knowledge of the PSI proposal could jeopardise its
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chances of success.165 The staff would rather potential initiative partners (and states that
had were not invited to the Core Group) learn about the initiative via confidential U.S.
government communications as opposed to through the press.166 In the case of the PSI,
issue intractability at the domestic level thus favoured TGN-based cooperation, which in
turn, allowed collective action to pass more easily under the domestic radar screen.
Together, the six conditions outlined above served to lay the groundwork for the
formation of the PSI. Without the U.S. acting as a quasi-imperial manager, it is unlikely
that the PSI would have come about. The U.S. not only manages and coordinates the
bureaucratic elements of the PSI but it also bankrolls the majority of the PSI training
exercises. The opportunity for heterogeneous contracting, on the other hand, allowed the
U.S. to shape the initiative in line with its own agenda and objectives. The U.S. could
sidestep the international spoiler issue by inviting allies and countries that it already knew
would play nice. Moreover, as an informal cooperative solution, which lacks a legal
framework, the U.S. was able to quickly implement the initiative in order to address a
pressing issue that required immediate attention. Finally, the secretive nature of the PSI
enabled the U.S and other participating countries to minimise domestic controversy that
could have otherwise posed a serious challenge international cooperation. This Chapter
has, thus far, demonstrated that despite claims that it is not an organisation, the PSI is
indeed a TGN, and that the conditions and drivers of TGN formation as identified in
Chapter Two serve to explain why the PSI has arisen and taken the form that it has. Using

165

Koch, p. 8

166

Ibid.

89

the information outlined above, the next section will demonstrate how the PSI represents
an evolution of the TGN framework.

3.2.3

PSI as an Evolution of TGNs within the Non-proliferation Regime
TGNs are not an entirely new addition to the state-centric non-proliferation

regime, however, the role that they play in this regime has evolved over time. Multilateral
export control initiatives such as the Zangger Committee, the MTCR, the AG, and the
NSG have all played an increasingly important and, at times, prominent role in aiding
non-proliferation efforts since the early 1970s. These organizations certainly meet the
criteria for transgovernmental networking and support the claim of a growing trend
towards TGNs within the non-proliferation issue area. Export controls, for example,
represent an attempt by states to manage the “cross-border flows of goods, technologies,
and information,”167 and are a key functional element in any non-proliferation effort. As
Michael Lipson notes, export control policy and practice have increasingly become a
function of mid-level officials and experts working with a large degree of autonomy from
the executive and the concerns of “high politics.”168 Agreements on common lists of
controlled items, targets and procedures for controlling exports are implemented through
national laws and regulations.169 With the exception of the Zangger Committee, which
has a formal treaty basis, the majority of these TGNs are not directly and formally
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attached to treaties. Yet, while these organisations certainly constitute TGNs, they are
technically oriented. They function singularly to plug gaps and set standards that the
formal state-centric structure, for a number of reasons, is unable to set. They are
subsidiary to the existing treaty/IGO structure, providing compliance-based support to
treaties as opposed to forming the core component of cooperation over a politically
salient issue.
Earlier in this chapter, I offered a diagrammatic representation of the traditional
state-centric non-proliferation regime. I now provide a more specific illustration of the
relationship between various components of this regime, particularly, the relationship
between TGNs and the treaty/IGO-based structure. The core component of the nonproliferation regime is a set of widely adopted international treaties, including the NPT,
the CWC, and the BWC. The outer circle of this diagram represents formal IGOs such as
the IAEA and the UN, which serve as an engine for deliberation or an enforcement
mechanism, monitoring compliance with the proliferation treaties. Connected to the
treaty/IGO structure are a range of TGNs, including the multilateral export and supplier
groups as such as the NEC, the NSG, the AU, and the MTCR. These TGNs are closely
tied with the formal regime. Although they do not have a treaty basis, they are not
independent of the existing structure.
Diagram A below, however, is no longer an accurate depiction of the architectures
of cooperation that exist within the non-proliferation regime today. As this chapter has
discussed in great detail, the contours of the non-proliferation regime and the nature of
the regime components have changed considerably since the end of the Cold War. Events
such as the fall of the Soviet Union, the attacks of 9/11, and the discovery of the A.Q
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Khan nuclear weapons related trafficking network have created new vulnerabilities and
threats for the United States. These events have provided evidence to support the claim
that not only are rogue states and terrorist networks actively pursuing WMD capabilities,
these actors are key components of a secondary proliferation market which exists beyond
the scope of the traditional state-oriented apparatus. The PSI-TGN is the U.S
government’s response to these threats. The PSI is not simply another example of
transgovernmental networking or an attempt to plug regulatory and compliance gap in the
traditional regime; it is a “more dynamic, creative, and proactive approach to preventing
proliferation transfers to and from nations and nonstate actors of proliferation
concern.”170
Diagram (A): TGNs Traditional Non-proliferation Regime
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Diagram B provides an illustration of this new and evolved non-proliferation
regime. Alongside the traditional state-oriented apparatus now exists the PSI-TGN
structure, which constitutes the core of political cooperation over a highly salient issue. It
shares with the multilateral export control and supplier initiatives the fundamental
characteristics of a TGN. However, unlike the export and supplier initiatives, the PSI is
not a subsidiary component of the existing regime; rather it serves as a functional
substitute for IGO/treaty based cooperation. The PSI supports the traditional regime by
reinforcing the non-proliferation norm established through the core treaties. However, it
has also helped to catalyse a shift in the long-held norm regarding the use of force and
interdiction on the high seas.

Diagram (B) TGNs in the new Non-proliferation Regime
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SFI

The PSI has also given birth to and is supported by a number of another TGNs
like the CSI and the SFI. These TGNs interact with the wider non-proliferation regime,
creating a network of networks. For example, launched in 2002, the CSI
“allows U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) working with host
government Customs Services, to examine high-risk maritime containerized cargo
at foreign seaports, before they are loaded on board vessels destined for the
United States.171”
At present, there are 58 foreign ports that participate in the CSI, accounting for 85
per cent of container traffic that is bound for the U.S.172 While the CSI was founded prior
the PSI, it is a complementary initiative as it also focuses on enhancing global maritime
security, albeit on a technical and less politically salient issue. The SFI was launched by
the Department DHS in 2006 to support the efforts of the CSI and the PSI. This initiative
“uses the latest available technology to enhance risk management tools to identify
containers that pose a risk to the global maritime supply chain.”173 The SFI capitalised on
the momentum that was generated by the PSI in order to reach a political commitment in
the maritime container-shipping issue. This Initiative deploys a range of existing
technology and proven nuclear detection devices in foreign ports to check containers
headed to the U.S. If and when the alarm sounds, both the DHS and the host country will
simultaneously receive an alert.174
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While the initial non-proliferation TGNs were founded in the 1970s, it was only
in the 2000s that TGNs began to grow in scope and number. Networks like the
multilateral export and supplier initiatives served a regulatory and standard setting
purpose but they also provided evidence that the TGN framework could be used as an
effective and comparatively efficient method of cooperation on larger and more salient
issues. Following 9/11, the threat of WMD terrorism, the weaknesses in the state-centric
regime as highlighted by the So San incident, and the urgent need for the U.S to take
action, the TGN framework seemed to provide an ideal architecture for cooperation. Not
only did it offer the U.S. and the potential participants a range of functional benefits but it
also enabled the U.S. to exercise managerial power on its own terms and in line with its
own objectives. The evolution of the TGN framework within the non-proliferation regime
occurred because the U.S. wanted to act quickly and effectively, whilst also maintaining a
large degree of power over the shape and nature of action.
In this Chapter, I have discussed how and why the non-proliferation regime has
evolved over time. I have considered the prominence of formal state-oriented treaty based
arrangements such as the NPT, the CWC, and the BWC and the growing trend towards a
range of less formal initiatives, including multilateral export control efforts such as the
Zangger Committee, the AG, and the NSG, and today the PSI. I have distinguished
between export control TGNs and the PSI-TGN framework with the objective of
demonstrating that the PSI-TGN is not simply a subsidiary to the existing treaty/IGO
framework. Rather, it constitutes the engine for political cooperation. It represents an
evolution of the role of TGNs within the non-proliferation regime. I have demonstrated
that decision by U.S public officials to pursue cooperation through the PSI-TGN
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framework was based on a calculation of the benefits that informal cooperation could
provide to the U.S. as opposed to formal cooperation.
In the future, TGNs may serve a dual purpose as they do within the nonproliferation regime. They may strengthen and supplement traditional tools in some
areas, while also promoting policy convergence and supplanting treaties in other areas.
Although this Chapter has focused on the non-proliferation issue area, it is intended to
further our understanding of the wider operational dynamics of TGNs. It is plausible that
findings from the non-proliferation regime are applied to other issue areas. In the next
chapter, I conclude by briefly considering an issue that is still awaiting an enforcement
mechanism – small arms. The objective of the next chapter is to briefly consider the
future of transgovernmental security cooperation and to determine whether the PSI-TGN
model can be promoted to fit select transnational issues that require immediate attention.
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Chapter Four: PSI & The Future of Transgovernmental Security Cooperation

A decade after the launch of the PSI and following numerous calls by U.S.
government officials to institutionalise this TGN into a formal treaty, the PSI remains a
loose, informal network of cooperation. While many have expressed concerns regarding
the failure of U.S. officials to garner endorsement from key states like India, Pakistan,
and China, the PSI-TGN framework has, nonetheless, served as an effective means to
coordinate action on a highly salient issue. PSI participants have worked closely over the
last ten years to impede shipments of WMD, delivery systems, and related materials to
and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern.
The purpose of this concluding Chapter is to briefly consider the future of the PSI
and transgovernmental security cooperation, in particular, the expansion of the PSI
cooperative relationship to include relevant private sector actors. This chapter also asks
whether the PSI interdiction model could be promoted to fit select transnational issues
that require immediate action but where implementing rapid treaties may be politically
difficult. The example considered here is the issue of small arms.

4.1 Looking Forward: The Proliferation Security Initiative
While the non-proliferation regime continues to be dominated by formal treaties,
informal networks and arrangements have played an increasingly prominent role in
policy discussions regarding how to curb the proliferation of dangerous materials. As
Roberts notes, the PSI and other recent loose non-proliferation initiatives are making
concrete contributions to building a “network of networks” – creating a web that prevents
the trafficking of WMD related materials.175
I suggest that over the coming years, the PSI will evolve from a
transgovernmental entity to a transnational entity. Transnational applies to when “we
relax the assumption that states are the only actors, and “transgovernmental” applies
when we relax the assumption that states act as units.”176 Aside from states and their substate representatives, there are a more diverse set of public and private actors and
interests at play in the non-proliferation issue area. Avant notes that among global
governance arguments, the U.S. is “seen as a particularly important part of a complex
array of state and non-state actors that work toward global goals.”177 The question of
whether the PSI will endure over time, however, depends not simply upon which
relationship U.S. policy makers decide to work through in pursuit of their goals but also
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the kind of role that the complex array of non-state actors play toward achieving this
goal.
At first glance, the issue area under question, interdiction on the high seas to curb
the proliferation of WMD and related materials, falls neatly within the domain of highpolitics. Non-proliferation policy has traditionally been addressed via executive-level,
treaty based cooperation. IGOs serve as the engine for deliberation and as a means of
ensuring compliance as opposed to entities with their own interests and objectives. As has
been discussed in this paper, there are positive incentives for decision-makers to
cooperate on some issues at the sub-state level; nevertheless, these expert units are still
derived from and attached to their respective states. Non-state actors, like private
companies and civil society organisations, on the other hand, may have interests that
diverge from the interests of the states that they operate in or are headquartered in. While
sometimes TGN-based cooperation can help collective action to pass more easily under
the domestic radar, this is not always possible. Private interest groups may be powerful
enough to act as spoilers to cooperation or their support may be vital to the success of
collective state action. For instance, in the non-proliferation issue area, and with specific
relevance to the PSI, the question of liability for delayed cargo remains unresolved. As
Roberts notes, most shipments are “just-in-time” deliveries, which means that the
warehouse is either non-existent or kept to a minimum to reduce costs. Diverting a
suspected ship to a port, off-loading its cargo, and inspect this cargo takes a great deal of
time.178 These vessels can carry up to 10,000 containers. Who is held liable to the private
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dealer that has lost money is an issue that is yet to be addressed by states,179 and it is a
constant hurdle for cooperation with the relevant private actors.
A governor’s ability to affect outcomes is largely dependent upon its interactions
with others. As Avant, Finnemore, and Sell argue: “No governor governs alone.”180
While private power is no substitute for state power, a new cast of global governors is
emerging who also play a role in the process of governance. Thinking in such a
governance framework clearly challenges the common dialogue about international
relations, which has long privileged the state as the most relevant referent object and the
subject of political debate in the international system. There are instances in the nonproliferation issue area where private actors have played a positive role in facilitating
collective action and achieving regulatory objectives. The CSI is a good example of a
cooperative relationship between states and the container industry. The latter has agreed
to implement anti-tampering devices and GPS tracking on containers to protect against
diversion or tampering. The benefit for the industry is that it reduces the financial burden
that arises as a result of being subject to mistaken stop-and-search interdictions.
Furthermore, the PSI OEG recently hosted a series of meeting with the private sector.
Individual countries like New Zealand have actively sought to improve the flow of
information between their governments and private industry including local traders and
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transport operators.181 While PSI formation was dependent upon transgovernmental
cooperation, the long-term success of this initiative will depend upon transnational
cooperation between a range of governors, including IGOs, NGOs, and domestic and
transnational corporations. The PSI’s evolution from a transgovernmental network to a
transnational network has already begun, and with the growing involvement of the
private sector, it is likely to gain momentum over the next few years. This multilayer and
multiactor approach will create a network of networks, that is, a web of denial that
greatly diminishes if not eliminates the threat of WMD proliferation.

4.2 Beyond Non-proliferation: Small Arms and Light Weapons
Given the success of the PSI framework in engendering support from 102
countries and in providing a proactive mechanism to counter proliferation, can a PSI-like
framework also be promoted to fit select transnational issues that require immediate
attention but where implementing rapid treaties may be politically difficult? The issue
area under consideration here is small arms. Like the non-proliferation issue, it is highly
politically salient and policy makers have struggled to reach a universal treaty concerning
the interdiction of vessels that are suspected of carrying illicit small arms.
Small arms and light weapons (SALW) can be defined as “hand-held and crewserved weapons of under 100mm calibre. That covers everything from hand guns to
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automatic rifles to shoulder-launched surface-to-air-missiles and their ammunition.”182
The fall of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s brought fresh supplies of assault rifles and
a range of other easily portable weapons to the global market. As Waltz notes, these
weapons “began flooding conflict zones, threatening life, and livelihood of the world’s
poorest peoples.”183 SALW have played a critical role in sustaining civil war violence
and many have argued that they constitute a fundamental threat to human security.
Furthermore, Avant suggests that in the 1980s and 1990s, as the demand for larger
conventional weapons waned, the production of small arms and the interconnectedness of
arms manufactures grew.184 The increased prominence of illicit SALW on the global
market led many, including activists, governments, and IGOs such as the UN, to call for
industry regulation. The U.S., as the hegemon, found itself at the centre of this regulatory
battle. On the one hand, the pro-regulation camp urged the U.S. to support and enforce
regulation as a global public good.185 On the other hand, anti-regulation groups such as
the NRA mobilised to pressure the U.S. government to use their sovereign authority to
resist international regulation. This argument was derived from U.S. domestic concerns
regarding the Second Amendment right to gun ownership.186 Formally, the U.S. policy on
small arms constitutes a dual track approach - there exists a desire to promote legitimate
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exports, while also curbing backchannel deals and the illicit spread of weapons. In reality,
however, the position of the U.S. government has generally reflected that of the NRA –
stymieing any form of regulation. The United States has also come to be viewed by most
countries and pro-regulation groups as a major obstacle to formal treaty cooperation.
On April 2, 2013, an overwhelming majority in the UN General Assembly voted
in favour of a landmark Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). This treaty regulates the international
trade in conventional arms, including small arms and light weapons (SALW). To the
surprise of many, including the U.S. Senate, the U.S. government joined 152 other states
in voting in favour of this treaty. The purpose of the ATT is to stop the illicit flow of
destabilising weapons to conflict regions. Article 9 of this treaty refers to the transit or
trans-shipment of SALW:
“Each State Party shall take appropriate measures to regulate, where
necessary and feasible, the transit and transshipment under its jurisdiction of
conventional arms under Article 2 (1) through its territory in accordance with
relevant international law.”187
The UN has hailed the ATT as a landmark document and a monumental
achievement following seven years of negotiations. However, U.S. government officials
are already questioning whether the U.S. will sign the treaty when it opens for signature
on June 3. Even if the U.S. signs the treaty, it seems highly unlikely that the Senate will
ratify and enact it.
Assuming one of the two likely situations unfolds over the next few years – the
U.S. does not sign the ATT or the U.S. signs the ATT but it does not receive Senate
187
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ratification – could a PSI-like framework be used to monitor and regulate the illicit global
trade in SALW? More importantly, would the U.S. be willing to exercise productive
managerial power in order to guarantee the success of this initiative or would domestic
interests such as those of the NRA be too great of an impediment to political
cooperation?
While, the Wassenaar arrangement is aimed at promoting transparency and
greater responsibility in transfers of conventional arms and dual-use goods and
technologies, it lacks the apparatus necessary to regulate, monitor, and interdict the
transit and transshipment of SALW. Theoretically, however, the PSI SIP could be
combined with existing programmes to disrupt trade by land, sea, and air. To a certain
extent, a PSI like model already exists. The U.S. Export Control and Related Border
Security (EXBS) Program was established in the 1990s to help countries fulfil their
obligations under UN Security Council 1540 and to help them establish capabilities to
detect, interdict, investigate, and prosecute illicit transfers of WMD, WMD-related
materials, and conventional weapons, including SALW. The EXBS is active in 50
countries and the program is implemented by drawing on the expertise of IGOs, NGOs,
foreign governments, the private sector, and U.S. Government agencies.188 The DOS
EXBS webpage makes explicit reference to the PSI as one of the key initiatives that it is
working to enforce. Both small arms and WMD require similar intelligence, legal, and
military tools and capabilities, which would suggest that the SALW issue might lend
itself to PSI cooperation and inclusion into the SIP. However, there is one primary reason
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for why the U.S may want to avoid making explicit reference to SALW in the SIP:
opposition from the domestic arms control lobby. Given its track record of stymieing
political cooperation, the NRA is likely to object to the U.S. supporting any written
statement, albeit informal, that regulates the trade in SALW. The trade in small arms is an
issue of high political salience where U.S domestic hurdles to cooperation may be too
great to overcome. Perhaps, given the fact that SALWs are a key component of the EXBS
program, which helps to enforce the PSI, and that the PSI is working to interdict
shipments suspected of carrying WMD related materials, what may be more helpful and
effective in stopping the illicit trade of SALW is the geographic expansion of the EXBS.
Although the PSI does not directly cover SALW, EXBS participating states are already
being trained by U.S. officials to interdict ships that are suspected of carrying illicit
SALWs. Expanding participation of this programme may be a more effective means of
addressing the issue as opposed to pursuing cooperation with the NRA on a formal or an
informal commitment that they are unlikely to ever support.

Conclusion
International security is traditionally considered to be beyond the scope of
transgovernmental networking. Yet, as this paper has demonstrated, TGNs have become
an increasingly prominent governance apparatus within issue areas like non-proliferation.
Following the fall of the Soviet Union, the events of 9/11, and the growing threat of
WMD terrorism, the U.S. reoriented its non-proliferation policy to target rogue states and
non-state actors of proliferation concern. The chosen vehicle for implementing this new
policy, the Proliferation Security Initiative, is not a formal treaty or an IGO; rather it is a
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flexible and decentralised network – a looser mechanism for cooperation that can easily
adapt to today’s diverse and unpredictable challenges. The trend towards TGNs in the
non-proliferation regime is best explained by the range of functional and strategic
benefits that TGNs can offer managerial and participant states, including flexibility, low
transaction costs, and the ability to bypass domestic approval and ratification processes,
as well as opportunities for heterogeneous contracting and the ability of certain powerful
states to influence ideas, norms, and the operating environment for other states through
the use of managerial power.
While the literature on TGNs has largely ignored underlying power distributions,
this paper has demonstrated that there exists a close relationship between power and
transgovernmental networking. TGN-based cooperation is more likely to occur and
succeed when there is concentrated power within an issue area, that is, the presence of a
resource rich actor, like the U.S., willing to exercise managerial power in a productive
way. Thus far, American officials have founded the vast majority of existing TGNs in
close cooperation with their allies. However, going forward it would be of interest to see
whether an alternative power or group of powers could assume the mantel of
responsibility. Could countries like China and India also act as “quasi-imperial
managers,” creating, implementing, and enforcing TGNs on issues where the U.S. has
blocked regulatory efforts or chosen not to exercise leadership authority?
In the future, TGNs may strengthen and supplement the traditional apparatus in
some areas, while also promoting policy convergence and supplanting treaties in other
areas. They may serve as stopgaps to formal treaties and mechanisms for plugging
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regulatory holes, or for some issue areas and certain problems, they may present a better
institutional design as opposed to formal centralised cooperation. The objective of this
paper was to explore the conditions under which TGNs arise and take the form that they
do. By identifying the threshold criteria for an entity to qualify as a TGN and the
conditions under which TGNs arise, this paper has laid the groundwork for an analysis of
TGN activity in other areas of security concern, like small arms. TGNs can help to
reform and restructure the international security governance framework by making it
more flexible and adaptable to today threats and tomorrow’s challenges.
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Appendix A: Proliferation Security Initiative Statement of Interdiction Principles
PSI participants are committed to the following interdiction principles to establish a more
coordinated and effective basis through which to impede and stop shipments of WMD,
delivery systems, and related materials flowing to and from states and non-state actors of
proliferation concern, consistent with national legal authorities and relevant international
law and frameworks, including the UN Security Council. They call on all states
concerned with this threat to international peace and security to join in similarly
committing to:
1. Undertake effective measures, either alone or in concert with other states, for
interdicting the transfer or transport of WMD, their delivery systems, and related
materials to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern. "States or nonstate actors of proliferation concern" generally refers to those countries or entities that the
PSI participants involved establish should be subject to interdiction activities because
they are engaged in proliferation through: (1) efforts to develop or acquire chemical,
biological, or nuclear weapons and associated delivery systems; or (2) transfers (either
selling, receiving, or facilitating) of WMD, their delivery systems, or related materials.
2. Adopt streamlined procedures for rapid exchange of relevant information concerning
suspected proliferation activity, protecting the confidential character of classified
information provided by other states as part of this initiative, dedicate appropriate
resources and efforts to interdiction operations and capabilities, and maximize
coordination among participants in interdiction efforts.
3. Review and work to strengthen their relevant national legal authorities where
necessary to accomplish these objectives, and work to strengthen when necessary
relevant international law and frameworks in appropriate ways to support these
commitments.
4. Take specific actions in support of interdiction efforts regarding cargoes of WMD,
their delivery systems, or related materials, to the extent their national legal authorities
permit and consistent with their obligations under international law and frameworks, to
include:
a. Not to transport or assist in the transport of any such cargoes to or from states or
non-state actors of proliferation concern, and not to allow any persons subject to
their jurisdiction to do so.
b. At their own initiative, or at the request and good cause shown by another state,
to take action to board and search any vessel flying their flag in their internal
waters or territorial seas, or areas beyond the territorial seas of any other state,
that is reasonably suspected of transporting such cargoes to or from states or
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c.

d.

e.

f.

non-state actors of proliferation concern, and to seize such cargoes that are
identified.
To seriously consider providing consent under the appropriate circumstances to
the boarding and searching of its own flag vessels by other states, and to the
seizure of such WMD-related cargoes in such vessels that may be identified by
such states.
To take appropriate actions to (1) stop and/or search in their internal waters,
territorial seas, or contiguous zones (when declared) vessels that are reasonably
suspected of carrying such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of
proliferation concern and to seize such cargoes that are identified; and (2) to
enforce conditions on vessels entering or leaving their ports, internal waters or
territorial seas that are reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes, such as
requiring that such vessels be subject to boarding, search, and seizure of such
cargoes prior to entry.
At their own initiative or upon the request and good cause shown by another
state, to (a) require aircraft that are reasonably suspected of carrying such
cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern and that are
transiting their airspace to land for inspection and seize any such cargoes that are
identified; and/or (b) deny aircraft reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes
transit rights through their airspace in advance of such flights.
If their ports, airfields, or other facilities are used as transshipment points for
shipment of such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of proliferation
concern, to inspect vessels, aircraft, or other modes of transport reasonably
suspected of carrying such cargoes, and to seize such cargoes that are identified.
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Appendix B: States Endorsing the Proliferation Security Initiative Statement of
Interdiction Principles as of November 20, 2012

Afghanistan

Croatia

Luxembourg

Russia

Albania

Cyprus

Macedonia

Samoa

Angola

Czech Republic

Malta

Saudi Arabia

Antigua and

Denmark

Marshall Islands

San Marina

Barbuda
Argentina

Djibouti

Moldova

Serbia

Armenia

Dominica

Mongolia

Singapore

Australia

Dominican Republic

Montenegro

Slovakia

Azerbaijan

El Salvador

Morocco

Slovenia

Bahamas, The

Estonia

The Netherlands

Spain

Bahrain

Fiji

New Zealand

Sri Lanka

Belarus

Finland

Norway

St. Lucia

Belgium

France

Oman

St. Vincent and the Grenadines

Belsize

Georgia

Panama

Sweden

Bosnia

Germany

Papua New Guinea

Switzerland

Brunei Darussalam

Greece

Paraguay

Tajikistan

Bulgaria

Holy See

Philippines

Cambodia

Liberia

Poland

Canada

Libya

Portugal

Chile

Liechtenstein

Qatar

Colombia

Lithuania

Romania
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